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ABSTRACT 
Thi~ project studies the Renminbi (RMB) exchange 
fate system 'from three perspectives: arrangement, 
devaluation, and prospect~ 
The arrartgement of the RMB exchange rate has 
experienced dramatic changes in the past few decades. In 
the pre-refotm era, the rixed/pegged rate system was 




the RMB . In the 
caused the severe 
post-reform era, the 
arrangement of the RMB exchange rate became more and more 
f1exible artd market-driven; and the managed-floating rate 
system was established to fu1fill its leverage role. 
Overvaluatidn wa~ the utmost reason for the 
realignnient of . the RMB exchange rate. Besides this, t .l1.e 
Chinese governm~nt also adopted devaluation as a tool to 
promote export industry as well as to improve foreign 
trade balance. However, - due to some constraints, the 
devaluation could not effectively play its leverage role. 
The devaluation also caused variou~ consequences to 
Chihafs ihternal and external economy. 
owing to the wor~enihg foreign trade balance and the 
soaritlg irtflation in china, the RMB exchange rate might 
be bearish in hear future. !h the long run, the free 
cohvertibil1.ty of the RME is the ultimate gdal of China's 
IV 
cUrrency reform. Since a lot of prerequisites must be met 
at first, the free convert:Lbility of the RMB is a long 
way to go. 
As the RMB exchange rate i~ inseparable from other 
factors intera.cting ih the economy; the Chinese 
gov~rnment should take many complementary actions to 
strengthen the credibility of the newly-established 
exchange rate system. A healthy macroeconomic environment 
is very important to guarantee the success of China's 
currency reform. 
v 
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The Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate has experienced 
dramatic cnanges in the last few decades. It played 
different roles under different circumstances, keeping 
consistent with alterations in China's economic policies. 
The evolut:lon of . the RMB exchange rate system, as shown 
by its historic~l track t contain~ the following four 
distinctive pha~~~: 
Fixed R~t~ S1st~rn (Early 1950·s -- Middle 1970's) 
Fro~ early {950 f s to middle 1970's, under the rigid 
plahned economic , system, China had no incentive to use 
exchang~ rate as 'an ecortomic lever. The RMB exchange rate 
was thought as a symbol of the Chinese government's 
dignity and was characterized by its stability. However, 
this stable rate distorted the reai purchasing power of 
I 
the RME sUbstantially. Consequently, the RMB had been 
overva1ued for cl long time. 
Pegged ~ate System (~iddle 1970'~ -- Early 1980's) 
tn the middle of 1970' s, following the coll'apse of 
the Bretton Woods Sy~tem, China rearranged her exchange 
rate system by pegging the RMB to a basket of "hard 
cUt"retlcies. 1t Since then the RMB exchange rate 
2 
corresponded to fluctuations in the "basket currencies. 11 
This pegged rate mechanism, however, only reflected the 
relative undulations of the RMB against foreign 
currencies rather than the changes in the real purchasing 
power of the RMB. Therefore, the overvaluation of the RMB 
still remairted unjustified. 
Rearrangement of the RMB Exchange Rate System 
(Early 1980's -- Middle 1990's) 
Beginn:lng from the early 1980' S t China exerted her 
economic reform policies. With introduction of market 
economy, the RMB exchange rate inevitably started to play 
its leverage role in regUlating the country's economic 
activities, especially in the field of foreign trade. In 
the early 1980·8; China ceased the pegged rate system and 
made the RMB rate floating, with an intention to improve 
h~r balance of international payments. During this 
period, the RMB exchange rate system waS characterized by 
the followi~g two facts: 
Repeatea Realignments of the Official Rate 
The RMB exchange tat~ underwent dramatic changes in the 
post-reform . era. From 1981 to 1991, the Chinese 
~overnmeht announced substantial depreciations of the RMB 
exchdng~ rate so as to correct the overvalued RMB and to 
eXpedite China' f3 export industry. The ·'~ RMB official rate 
against US dollar plummeted from renmirtbi 1.50 to 
rertminbi 5.20, with a 247 percent cumUlative decrease. 1 
The devaluation, which took place on a discrete basis 
iCHinese statistical Yearbook~ st~te statistical B~re~u, 1993, 
p. 51j. 
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rather than gradua11y, however, could not reflect the 
chahges in the macro environment. The nonce arid for all" 
method of substantial devaluation induced big shakes to 
the nation's economy_ 
The sharp and periodic devaluations of the RMB 
official rate occUrred before April 1991. After then, the 
exchang~rate underwent more frequent, minute, and 
downward realigrtments, becoming more flexible to adjust 
the China 1 s economy. However, compared to the swap rate 
in the swap market, the RMB official rate was still 
overvalued (see Table II) . 
MUlti-Rate System 
The coexistence of the official rate and the market 
rate of the RMB was another distinctive feature of 
China's exchange rate system in the period. Parallel to 
the official rate, the Internal Settlement Rate (ISR) was 
adopted in 1981 to coordinate with the country's foreign 
trade r~form and to subsidize the export firms. Later on, 
-- ----
the establishment of the foreign exchange retention' 
system resulted in the emergence of swap centers and the 
corresponding swap rates. In 1~85t the ISR and the 
official rate were converged. Meanwhile, the swap rate 
-- ------.--.--- ----... ----------------.~-..- -~ 
and the swap market achieved breakthrough developments . 
Ih the first half of 1993, China's overheated 
economy triggered th~ :, ' ~rate to pltihge sharply at the 
, ;! "i ;'! -: ,'; I f , J 
.. , - ".", ' 
swap centet"s _ The swap fate against US dollar plummeted 
, , 
to the bottom at rehminbi 10.1 • III July, 1993. 2 
2Anonymous, China Economic ~ews, External Service~ ' Division of 
gconomic Dail}'"t june 29, 1993. 
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Neverthel~ss, the rate was stabilized in August by the 
government1s austerity program and the central bank's 
intervention. 
Managed Floating Single Rate System (Middle 1990's --) 
r--- --.----.---... -.--." ..- - .. ~-""--------.--.. ---...... - ... 
The RMB exchange rate system stepped into a new 
~tage in 1994, when chiha unified the official rate and 
the swap rate. Since then China implemented the "managed 
floating single rate system", making the RMB rate more 
flexible artd market driven. This was thought as 
compatible with China's in-depth progress of 
marketization. The free convertibility of the RMB, which 
is the ulti~ate goal of Chinats currency reform, was also 
included in the agehda. 
Purposes of study 
bespite that the RMB exchange rate system is 
becoming freer al1d more flexible, there are still many 
problems and issues which have yet to be explored. 
The primary purpose of this project is to generalize 
a framework of the RMB exchange rate system from 
macroeconomic perspective, and to identify and analyze 
the problems in this system. The secondary purpose of 
this project is to work out Some feasible solutions to 
the prob1ems, and to provide overseas investors with some 
meaningful guidance to avoid.ing exchange rate risks in 
China. 
statements of Problems 
In drder to better understand China's exchange rate 
system and work out some feasible solutions to the 
5 
problems existing in this system, we have pinpointed our 
res~arch ~rea and spelled out the following statements of 
problems: 
To see bow the current arrangement 6f the RMB 
exchahge rate system works and how it is 
different from the previous ones. 
To examine tbe cbanges which the RMB exchange 
rate system has uhdergone. 
To study the reasons of the RMB over-valuation 
in the Pctst and the determinants of such an 
over-valu~d rate. 
To ihve~tiga te the reasons for the RMB 
devaluatibn, and to evaluate its subseqUent 
impacts. 
to piedict the future trend of the RMB exchange 
rat~ based on the preceding evaluations. 
To look at the free convertibility of RMB and 
the )?l·e-conc1itions to achieve this ultimate 
go~l. 
To make some recommendation::;'. for avoiding 
excbahge i-ate risksih China to foreign 
investors. 
Scope of Problem 
-
The arrangement; devaluation and prospect of the RMB 
~~change rate are the three major SUb-topics in this 
proj ect.. The studying period begins at the post - reform 
era in the early 1980'S and continues till the most 
6 
r~cent moment in 1994 j with special concentration on 
Issues irt the 1990's. 
Plan of the Report 
After introduction has been given in this chapter, 
we move to chapter two ~hich is the literature review on 
~xchdnge rate theories and some related topics. Chapter 
three explains the research methodology and its strength 
ana weakness.- ' Chapter four describes the exchange rate 
~ystem ~rtd its ~roblems as well as the determination bf 
the exchange rate in China. Chapter five analyses the 
causes and impacts of the RMl3 devaluation. Chapter I SlX 
focuses on the prospect of the RMl3 with emphasis on the 
iE!sue of exchange rate unification and free 
convertibili ty of the currency. Fltlally I conel usion and 





Many . e~perts have studied the issue of the RMB 
exchange rate system. It is the consensus that the 
a:trC1hgement of . the RMB exchange rate has experienced 
dramatic reform from a fixed rate system to a managed-
floatihg rate system (Wti Nianlu: 1992). The fixed rate 
~ystemi which derived from China's rigid central-planned 
economy; brought . many disadvantages to the country's 
economy (Luo Hart: 1993) 4 The managea floating rate 
system; which is thought &8 compatible with the in-depth 
marketiicttion progre~s in Ch~ha, seems td be better than 
the fi~ed one, since it is more flexible and realistic to 
reflect the market force (Shan~hai Asia Research 
lrtstitute: 1993). 
It should be ~oted that the credibility of the newiy 
implemented mai1C1ged floating rate systen1 still remains 
uncertalri (Chan Mart Hung: 1994). There is a risk that the 
Chir1ese goverrtmeht would over-emphasize the "managed" 
sid~ under the n~~ sy~tem, which le~d~ the new syste~ to 
return to the old fixed ohe (Chan Man Hung: 1994) ~ In 
reality; how to . recortcl1e the · conflict between "managed" 
and hfloating't, or in other words, how to set an 
appropriate range for the RMB rate to float, is still a 
thorny problem to china's policy makers (Chan: 1994). 
~ . 8 
The purchasing-
! ' 
power parity (PPP) was one 
\ 
theoretical basis that the 'Chinese government adopted to 
determine its eJechange ratk in the past (Chen Biaoru: 
1992). The PPP theory explicitiy states that the exchange 
rate i~ determined by the purchasing po~er of et currency 
against that of ' another currency. Since price index is 
the most direct reflection of a currency's purchasing 
power, the exchange rate can be thought as a pari ty 
between the overall price level in the domestic market 
~nd that in th~ international market (John. Daniels: 
1976) . 
studies showed that the RMB nominal purchasing power 
Was much higher than the real one in the past few decades 
(Chen Biao-ru: 1992). Since China did not establish a 
market-driven price system in the past, the exchange rate 
derived from the' PPP theory \ failed to reflect the real 
pUrchasing power of the RMB and thus was overvalued for 
fuany years ( Chen: 1992) . 
By nature, the realighment of the RMB exchange rate 
was a process of' the RM:E devaluation, which has 
~igrtificantly affected China's economy (Wu Nianlu: 1992). 
The impacts of the RMB devaluation; which have drawn 
considerable cotnmehts and }di§cussions, include foreign 
( 
; 
trade balance; i ! foreign direct 
: " !;! \ ~ : infl~tion; and m~H~I~~~~~ ar~~9. 
i " . ' , 
ihvestment; tourism; 
studies poirit~d. but that the RMB devaluation had no 
impact on depressing imports (Henny Sender: 1993). This 
&rOUsea bur intere~t to study why China's import demand 
is insen~itive to the change~ ill the RMB rate. A revlew 
9 
of the elasticity approach has given us some 
explanations. The approach states that a country's 
improvement oh foreign trade balance is subj ect to the 
structure of its export goods and import goods. The more 
elastic its export goods and import goods are, the more 
~ftecti~~ the dev~luation will be (L. Metzler: 1948). 
Applying this approach in our study, we have found why 
Chitla could not improve its trade balance simply by means 
of devaluation-'. 
Recently, mbre and more foreign investors complained 
the devast?-ting impacts of the RMB devaluation on their 
business in China (Carrie Lee: 1993). Therefore, how to 
tackle this foreign exchange risk ~ In China is another 
topic which we waht to study. 
China has announced that the ultimate goal of her 
currency reforni is to make 'the RME freely convertible 
(Hehny Sender: 1993). However; it is very apparent that 
china's current economic means cannot meet the 
pr~cohditions to free cOhvertibility (Shanghai Asia 
ReEfearch Institute: 1993). A generally accepted viewpoint 
is that china should fir~tlyrealize the free 
cohvertibility of the RMB · in current account, and then 
develop the means to realize the convertibility in 
capital account in~ the long run (Shanghai Asia Research 
!hstitute! 1993) ~ 
A thorough review of the past literature helped us 
to better l.inder~tandthe topics we are going to study. 
Since the issue of the RMB exchange rate is so complex 
that it cannot b~ separated fro~ other issues of China's 
10 
economy; we 'will devote much space of this report to 
discusEt the interaction between the RMl3 rate and the 
macro-economic environment, from the theoretical as well 




Eoth qualitative Clnd quantitative methods are 
applied in this proj ect. Some relevant theories about 
~xch~nge rate} such as the elasticity approach, are 
adopted for the purpose ot analysls ~ This proj ect is 
rtlCtitlly conducted br1 the basis of secondary information. 
Primary data are a1so collected for an~lyzirtg throUgh oUr 
intervlew with Dr~ Y. C. Jao, Reader of the Economics 
Department, University of Hong Kong, who is also an 
expert on Chiha's economic issues. 
Seconaary Source Data Collection 
This research begins with reviewing the 
pUblications_ on exchange rate theories 
arrangement or the RMB exchange rate. The 
subject headings ~re delineated for locating 






lJeval UCl tion/Deprecia tion t Foreign Exchange Con trol, Dual 
R~te System, Swap Rate, Exchange Rate Manipulation, 
Unlficc1tiol1 of tbe RME rate, and Free Convertibility_ 
The datct from bUsiness periodicals are sUpplemented 
by those from books that' discuss the RMB exchange rate 
system, foreign exchange control, devaluation, etc.. The 
governmeht docum~nts and the quotations oh daily 
h~Wspapers provid~ the ~ajori~y or stati§tical data about 
12 
the RMB exchange rate and its corresponding impacts on 
chinafs economy. The collected data are analyzed for 
elabbratlngthe relevant issues in this project. 
Primary SoUrce Data Collection 
For the purpose of collecting primary data, we 
arranged art ihterview wi th Dr. Y . C. Jao, an expert on 
. China t S ' . t eCOnomlC issues. In the interview; we aSked 
questions similar to those mentioned in the "statements 
of problems" section in chapter one. The information 
delivered by Dr. J~o is invaluable for our study. 
strengths and Weaknesses of the methodology 
AlthoUgh there are a lot of literature covering the 
I 
topic of exchange rate misalignment or realignment in the 
1ess developed countries, V~~3_~ _____ ~E:-=-<!~12th ______ ~:!J~_~~d~.es of 
the exchange rate problems in China can be found. The 
major reason may be due to the difficulties of data 
collectioh, as China lacks a comprehensive statistical 
record and data management system. 
owing to the incomprehensive data management system 
lt1 China and the difficulties in data collection in the 
research process, one of the weaknesses of our study is 




THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE RMB EXCHANGE RATE 
The Categorization of Exchange Rate System 
Exchansrerate policy is usually formulated to help a 
country to :reg·ulate her external and internal economy. To 
evaluate the achievement of this goal, some indicators, 
such as economic growth; employment level, and balance of 
international payments, can be used as yardsticks. 
Accordihg to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) 
definition, a couritry's exch~nge rate policy may fall 
into one of the following three categories: 3 
(1) Fixed/pegged rate syste~: The exchange rate is 
determined by fixing or pegging the home currency to 
another currency or a basket (composite) of other 
currencies; 
(ii) timited flexible ' rate system: The exchange rate is 
fl~xibly adjusted ~ithin a narrow spectrum; 
(iii) More flexible rate system: The exchange rate is 
floated and determined by a set of indices or by the 
~upply-demand relation in the foreign exchange market. It 
can be further categorized as: (1 ) Index-adjusted 
floating rate system; (2) Managed floating rate system; 
and (3) lndependently floating rate system. 
3chen, a!ao-ru, A study of RMB Exchange Rate, - East China 
P~d~~ogic~l College Pres~, 1992, p. s. 
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nltfeient countries may ~dopt differertt exchange 
rate policies according to their specific . economlC 
development strategies. Many developing countries follow 
either the export orientation mode or the import 
substitutioh mode to dlrect their economies. This 
aiffererttiation has implicatiorts on the formulation of 
. eXChan~e . rate pOlicy. f ost of the export-oriented 
countrles a_dopt flexible and sensitive -exchange rate 
systems due -'to - their over-dependence on foreign trade 
industries. Ih practice, they tend to undervalue the home 
currencies so : as to make their ._ export goods more 
competitive. whereas the import-substitution oriented 
! 
t ; - . 
countr1es prefet flxed or pegged rate systems, which are 
ti~ed to save import costs Ctrtd stabilize their internal 
economies .. '!'hes~ countries' home currencies are usually 
ove:tvalued.~ 
Although China's economy does not exactly fit the 
above two modes, some implications are still applicable 
here. Gerterally speaking, the RME exchange rate policy 
----------~--------~-~ 
has experienced a transformation from the fixed rate 
___ _ - -- - - -----------.,---.- - ... --~.-r- ___ ._._. __ ... _. _~. ______ ...... __ .__ _ _"' .... ~ .... ~_ ... ~. ~. ~ .. _ ... _, ____ .. __ 
system to the flexibl~ one~ following the changes in the 
-----_ ~_J _________ _ __ .. __ _ ~ _ _ 
countryts economic strategy. 
The arratlgemerit of the RMB exchange rate consists of 
two ftindam~ntal : issues: one is the selection of the RMB 
exchange rate system; the other is the determination of 
the RMB exchange rate. We will discuss them in the 
following part~ of this chapter. 
I 
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The Selection of the RMB Exchange Rate System 
The selection of the RMB exchange rate system 
uhderwent substantial changes over the past four decades. 
using China's introduction of reform policies as a 
watershed., we can partition the arrangement of the RMB 
~xchahge rate into two stage~: the pre-reform era and the 
post-reform era. 
Pre-Reform Era (1949 - 1979) 
Prior to China's implementation ' of reform policies, 
the arrangemerit of the RMB exchange rate was 
characterized by its static pattert1, especially during 
the period from the early 1950 I s to the middle 1970' s 
(see Table I ahd Exhibit Il. ~he exchange rate was 
thought asa syilibol of the couhtryts dignity and thus the 
stability of th~ - RMB exchange rate was a means to save 
face. s The RMB rate was fixed ' as a result of China's rigid 
central-planned ,economic system t under which the domestic 
I . prlces remained unchanged due to the government's 
control. The exchange rate was used mainly for domestic 
accouhting and formulation of plans; failing to play its 
- - ------- -
regulatory This system was 
recisonable at the initial time because China wished to 
ta~n~ge of the strong RMB to save the costs of her 
.......... ~----... , .~- .. -"~----~-... --.. .. --........ --.,.,....-~~ ..... ~ 
import g~~~ . It was also compatibl~ with the fixed rate 
polici~s under the Bretton Woods System, which was 
-_ .. _-------_ .. "'-" 
prevailing in the W<:J:~d _~~ __ ~~V 
. -
513rahm, La.tlrence J . , Foreign Exchange controls and strategies 
fot the Peoble's Republic of China, Hong Kong: Longman Group, 1990. 
6L Uo, Hart; ' ~ Renininbi Oui11 Exchange Rates to be Annul1ed li , china 
Market, May i991, p . 10. 
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After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 
-------=--------------
,r" ~ 
the m~Je 197~~), china adjusted her exchartge rate 
sy~tem by peggih~ the RMB rate to a basket of hard 
currencie~, with the US do1lar as a major weight. 7 It was 
thought that this pegged rate system could make the RMB 
rate invulnerable to forex exposures, thus keeping the 
country t a internal economy unshaken. As the US dollar r s 
value plummet~d due to the oil crisis in the late 1970's, 




rate system caused serious 
distortion of the RMB r s real value i since the rate was 
insensitive to mirror the relative changes in prices of 
both domestic and foreign goods. The overvaluation 
deteriorated the competitive edge of China's export 
industry; which was the maj or, source of the country's 
foreign exchange earnings. It also stimulated domestic 
demand for import goods, with huge imbalance of foreign 
trade as a result.R Furthermore; the fixed/pegged exchange 
rate system hindered Chinese enterprises from improving 
their operation efficiencies, since the long-term fixed 
exchange rate, as ~ell as the generous subsidy given by 
the Chinese government, had made them ignoring the 
------------ --.~ 
impacts ot price - fluctuation on their business 
- - -----, 
.-- - - .. ........ _._-----
strategiet3. 
-------
, 7Cheh, i3,i&o-ru, A study of RMB Exchange Rat~, East China 
pedago~ica~ College Press, 1992, p. 17. 
zhang, Yu-xian and Li, Xie, Appreciation? Dej2reciation? -- An 
Analysis of R~nmihbi Exchange Rate, People's university Press: 
Seijihg, 1992, p . 52. 
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Post-Reform Era (1980 - Present) 
realIzed the disadvantages of the 
fixed/peg~ed rate system; China started to adopt some 
f1exible measures in arranging the RMB exchange rate, 
making it to play the role as art economic lever. This re-
Alignmetlt was thought as consistent with the government's 
implemerttation of the "Open Door ft and the "Reform" 
policiesi which had integrated the country into the 
international arena and introduced the market mechanism 
to adjust the whole .economy. While the contemporary 
artang~ment of the RMB official rate became more and more 
flexible and market-driven, it was also characterized by 
the mUlti-rate system, until the recent unification in 
. early 1994. For s.implicity, we will develop the following 
discussion from two perspectives: The alteration of 
. official rate on · the one hand" and the evolution of the 
multi-rate system on the other hand. 
The Alteration of Official Rate 
. Although different from its two-decade's static 
pattern t the arrangement of the RMB official rate still 
retained some features of the fixed/pegged rate system, 
especially in the early stage between 1980 and 1984. In 
this period, although the RMB rate started to depreciate 
due to the rebound of the US dollar in the international 
money market, the government still applied the pegged 
:rate system to determine the RMB rate. A major difference 
from the pre-reforrn era was that the government . started 
to realize the " importance of the RMB rate to promoting 
eXport . arid adjtis.ting · . the balance of international 
~
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payments. 9 While the Internal Settlement Rate ' (ISR) was 
--
-
officictl rate was stt1l ove :t_~ v~lued and lacked the 
flexibilitY.- and seh8itivit~ to regulate the 
~-~-------
country's 
)pternal and external economy. 
vi ~ A distinctive change took place in early 1985, when 
China declared the impiementation of the "managed-
floating rate · system" by ceasing the RMB' s pegging to a 
composite of -''foreign currencies. Ihstead, the official 
rate wa~ set based on the average : forex earning cost, 
reflecting the government's inclination to use the rate 
as a lever to support export industry.ll The official rate 
underwent repeated adjustments since ' then t depreciating 
from RMB 2.32 per US dollar in ear1y 1985, to RMB 5.27 
per US dollar in fuiddle 1991 (see Table I and Exhibit I). 
A1 though more realistic than \ before, the RMB' s discrete 
and substantial adjustments in this period did not come 
up to the real meaning of the "~~haged-floating rate 
system. 'T 
The realignment of the RMB official rate became more 
smooth and frequent after April 1991 (see Table I and 
Exhibit I). However, the overvaluation of the RMB still 
remained unsolved. : 
More 
when Chirta 
stirpriElln9) i changes occurred in January 1994, 
convetJi~,~ 'IIJ~~t dual rat~{ system, making the 
.' ' .' :':: > . I: . ;, , ! , I; 
: : ' ': I 
official rate identidal to the mark;~t driven swetp rate. 
9arahm, taur~nde . j.i Foreign Exchande controls and strategies 
fat the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong: Longman Group, 1990. 
10More details about !SR is discussed in the section of "The 
Mu1ti-Rate System." 
lIChen, Siao-ru, A study of RMB Exchange Rate, East , China 
Peda~ogid~l College Pr~~~, 1992, ~. 18. 
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To this end, the arrangement of the RMB exchange rate 
stepped ohto a new stage; being worthy of the real 
tneahing of the "managed- floating rate system." J2 Market 
force replaced the exchange earning cost as a determinant 
of the exchange rate. This mechanism waS compatible with 
Chinats in-depth progress of marketization. While 
allowing the exchange rate to be driven by the supply-
demand relation in the market, China still wanted to 
retain sorne "' necessary control over the exchange rate 
fluctuation, with an intention to keep the relative 
~tability of the Rlvffi and the healthy development of the 
economy. However; the credibility of this newly-
established system is still uncertain~ 
The Multi-Rate SYstem 
After implementing the "Open Door" and "Reform" 
policies t while the arrangement of the official rate 
started to be more flexible; China also f01lowed a multi-
rate system So as to boost her export industry_ Parallel 
to the official rate, the Internal Settlement Rate (ISR) 
arid the Swap Rate were introduced for the purposes of 
export and • • lmprovlng the baiance of 
international payments. This arrangement indicated that 
China's exchange rate system was over-dependent on her 
foreign trade policy. 
(1) Internal Settlement Rate 
Being fixed for several decades; the RMB rate failed 
to mirrdr changes in the purchasing power parity between 
12Ch~h, Man-huhg, "A Y~ar of aig Charige for the Yuan," South 
China Mortlind Post, january 2, 1994. 
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1mB aria foreign . . currenCles, causing the real value of 
the RMB to be over-estlmated drastically. In 1981, when 
china opened her door to the outside world, the 
government · lifted its control on foreign trade and 
~dopted some deregulatory measureS to vigorate the export 
industry. How-ever, . the deregUlation would not motivate 
expo:tt~ra · too much, given the over-valued exchange rate 
unchanged, ~ince it was unable to cover the ever-rising 
exchange earning cost which made export unprofitable. 
To reconclle this contradictioh, China introduced 
the Internal Set.tlement Rate on Jahuary 1, 1981, which 
was used for the settlement of export and import 
transactions. Meanwhile the official rate, which had a 
premium of 46 percent over the ISR, was still used for 
the settlement of nort-trade transactions. Since the 
authority held that the &ME rate urtder the non-trade 
accounts was not over-valued (a simple thing was that the 
prices of services in Chiha were much lower than those in 
developed countries), the government thought that a re-
c111ghttteht of the official rate was unnecessary. 
The coexistence of ISR and the official rate was the 
prototype of Chinats multi-rate system. The ISR was set 
by the government based on the average exchange earning 
cost bf exportation, plus a profit margin of 10 percent. 13 
1jzhang, yu-xian and Li, xie, Appreciation? Depreciation? -- An 
Analysis of Renminbi Exchange Rate, People's University Press: 
Seijing, 1992, p. 40. 
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It was thought that the ISR could play a leverage 
tole in regulating the foreign trade industry in China, 
as it moved closer to the RMB's real value. Set above 
cost, this rate made export profitable, and. sharpened the 
Chinese exporters' competitive edges. Meanwhile, the 
devalued ISR made import more expensive, and thus 
depressed the domestic demand for foreign goods. It was 
hoped that ~his mechanism could improve China's balance 
of internationai payments. 
However, the ISR's equilibrium role was just short-
lived because i~ Was too rigid and insensitive to follow 
changes in the 'tni:lcro environment. The ISR was set by the 
I 
governmeht at RMB 2.8 per US dollar and remained 
unchanged till its cancellation. However, the exchange 
earning cost; which was a primary determinant of the ISR, 
did rtot keep unchanged during the same period. Owing to 
the inflation pressure in the domestic market, the 
exchange earning cost rose rapidly, which in turn 
affected exporters' profitability. Meanwhile the official 
rate depreciated steadily, mainly due to the contemporary 
appreciation of the US dollar, which was the major 
component of China' s "basket currencies It. The narrowing 
gap between the ISR and the official rate reduced the 
ISR's incehtive r.ole in promoting export. Not being 
adjusted to these changes, the ISR ended its life on 
January 1; 1985) when the official rate plummeted to the 




(2) Swap Rate 
The cancellation of the ISR did not change China's 
mUlti-rate system. In practice, the ISR was replaced by 
~nother parallel rate ; i.e. the swap rate, which was also 
adopted by the government to complement with its foreign 
trade str~tegie~. 
The ' so-called swap rate derived from the foreign 
~xchange retention system, a special arrangement in 
Chlna's foreign trade reform. As mentioned earlier, China 
deregulated her foreign trade industry in the early 
1990's to promote export. The foreign exchange retention 
system was introduced as a means to motivate exporters. 
Under this system, enterprises selling forex earnings 
made from export to the state-owned banks were entitled 
to obtain the forex retention quota ', Cl right shown · in 
valUe terms on a piece of paper A firm having this 
quota could either Use it to re-convert forex from the 
state banks at the cheaper official rate for the payment 
of import, or sell it at premium in the nation-wide forex' 
§wap cehters. Given China's situation where foreign 
exchange was still very scarce, such a preferential 
treatment would inevitably infuselncentives to the 
exporters. In reality, it was an indirect subsidy granted 
by the government f since enterprises having the forex 
quota could • sell it at Cl higher price to compensate 
export losses or make profits. It was believed that such 
an arrctngemertt could encourage the exporters to expand 
their exchange earning sources. 
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The application of foreign exchange retention system 
inctlrr~d th~ needs for trading the forex quotas t which in 
turn resul ted in the emergence of the swap market. The 
major suppliers in the swap market were the exporters who 
had retention quotas in hands, whereas the major 
demanders were the importers who had no access to 
obtaitlihgforex from the state banks, and the joint-
ventures (JV). who needed to balance their forex capital. 
To this end, we can See thett the swap market not only 
facll1tated the transactions of forex quotas, but also 
improved China' ~ investment envirortment, as it provided 
JVs with a ch~rtnel to change their RMB for foreign 
currencies ~ Up ;to 1993, there were more than a hundred 
Swap centers throughout the country, locating mainly in 
I 
; 
special economic zones and provincial, capitals. However, 
the swap market was very fragmented. Electronic 
communication links among these centers were not 
available, and arbitrage across centers was not allowed. 14 
The swap rat~ was the price of foreign exchang~ 
traded in the swap market. Like the fbrmer ISR, it was a 
p~ral1el e~change ~~te coekisting with the official rate. 
A major difference between the swap rat~ and the ISR was 
that; in contrasting to the ISR, which was set by the 
~overtlment t th~ : ' ;~~fP irate was det,e!rmined mainly by the 
~t1pply and demafi1 f l i ,~H,~,t~on in thEq'swap market, and the 
coverage of i ts~~tll{cation was muibh broader. In fact, 
14Cole; arett, "itow Chirta's swap Centers Work," South China 
~orriihq Post~ Jul~ 29, 1992. 
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this market driven rate wets more flexible Clnd sensitive 
to reftect the changes in the macro environment. · 
The ~wap market achieved breakthrough progresses in 
the period after 1990. Trade volume in the swap market 
amounted to more than 80% of China's total forex 
tu:t11over, and the swap rate began to play increasingly 
significant roles in adjusting the coUntry's economy.15 In 
practice; the swap rate was widely used in the field of 
foreign trade / for the settlement of both export and 
import: tathereas the higher official rate was only used in 
the non-trade transactions, such as the exchange of 
foreign currency for the FEes, and a narrow range of 
import goods which enj oyed the privileges given by the 
government. In contrast to the ever-growing importance of 
the swap rate, the official rate's tale faded and tended 
to be less Influential. 
Pros and Cons of the Multi-Rate System 
1na sense, China has reaped what it intended to 
achieve by adopting the mUlti-rate system: promoting '. 
e:kport, depressing import, as well as . ; lmprovlng 
investment environment. 
In the initial stage, the multi-rate system was 
thought as understandable since it was compatible with 
China.' S ;'double- track system" i i. e. the coexistence of 
the central -plannea economy and the market economy. Under 
th:ts "doUble-track syst~m", everything ih China. had two 
prices t one planned price and one market price, and there 
15k~atley, ~ob~~t, hchinA Swap Centers ~re Likely to be Headed 
for ~e1cotT1e Chartges, " . Asian Wall street Journal, September 7, 1993. 
25 
was ho exceptioh for the RMB exchange I rate. with the 
deepening of China's marketization progress and the 
gradual abolition of the "double-track system", however, 
such a multi-rate system would bring more disadvantages 
than advantages. 
Firstly, this system infringed upon the interest of 
toreign investors in China~ The Chinese government 
etipulat~d that, in forming a sino-foreigrijoint venture, 
conttibution df both parties to the venture's registered 
capital should be computed at the official rate. For 
example; when the Chinese and foreign sides invested an 
equal amount of money in a joint venture which had a 
registered capital of US$ 2 million, the foreign investor 
should contribute US$ 1 million, whereas the Chinese side 
should contribute the equivalent amount of RMB computed 
at the official rate, say, RMB 5.8 million which namely 
equctled to US$ 1 million, given the official rate of RMB 
5.8 per US dollar. However, if the foreign investor sold 
its contribution in the swap cehters at a market rate, 
~ctYt 8.7 RMB per Us dollar; it could get RMB 8.7 milllon, 
a figure which was 2.9 million higher than the Chinese 
contribution. In other words; the adoption of the 
official rate in calculating registered capital 
contributioh made :eoreign investment more costly, which 
was obvlou~ly unfair to foreign investors. 
Secondiy, this system affected financial income. The 
Chinese law stipulated that foreign currency earned by 
j dint ventures should be exchanged to the RMB at the 
rate for taxes. The mu1ti-rate system 
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might benefit those export-oriented JVs. Their import 
costs 'of raw material were computed according to the 
market rate and their products were sold at a price set 
according to the off·ici~l rate~ thus reducing profits and 
m~king it possible for them to pay less taxes. 
Thirdly, this system forced up commodity , prlces. 
GenerallYt 'enterprises bought foreign raw materials with 
forex which they had got at the market price. This pushed 
up th~ produc~lon costs and naturally the prices of their 
products; and eventually pushed up prices of similar 
products in the domestic market. 
ForthlYi this system deteriorated fair competition. 
The mUlti-tate system implied that the export industry 
was indirectly : subsided by the government, making it 
favorable in competing with foreign counterparts. Such a 
d t • .. i t lSCrlmlt1a ory ~xchange rate 'arrangement was criticized 
by the IMF and other countries. 
The Termlnation of Multi-~ate System 
At present, this "double track system" turned out to 
b~ more ~nd mbre incompatible with China's economic 
policie~. The in-depth marketizatiotl progress in China 
required a more flexible and market-driven exchange rate 
system, ~hich induced the government to establish a new 
exchange rate system. In addition, the multi-rate system 
was often accused by the IMF and many western countries, 
a~ it was thought a~ a discri~inatory means of exchange 
r~te manipuiation. This mUlti-rate system, if kept 
Urlc!tctnged, woUld invalidate China's effort to re-enter 
the GATT. 
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On the other side, the breakthrough development of 
the stalap market in recent years ma.d.e it feasible for 
China to abolish the multi-rate system. As the swap rate 
wa~ widely ~ccepted and it played increasingly important 
roles, it moved closer to mirror the real value of the 
RMB. When the official rate was becoming less-influential 
111 regulating China's economy, the unification of the 
dual rate sy~tem turned out to be inevitable. / Oh JanuarY' 1, 1994 , China converged the two rates 
overnight, making the official rat~ identical to the 
market rate. This effort indicated that the RMB exchange 
rate had become a managed-floating one, a step welcomed 
by the world. If the government couid build up a soUnd 
I . . i 
macro-economlC environment in the coming years, this new 
~y~tem might play lt~ leverag~ role more effectively. 
j . The Determination of rum exchange Rate 
~here are a lot of theories applicable 
determinirtg et country's exchartge rate, such as 
in 
the 
purchasing power parity approach (PPP) , the elasticity 
approach, the portfolio balance approach, and the 
absorption approach, just to name a few. A country may 
set the exchange rate of its currency based on these 
theories. 
Although China had never pUblicized how to set the 
RMB exchange rate; it was said that the government 
applied the ~pp approach as a guide to formulate the RMB 
price. 16 That • lS to say, the · determination of the RMB 
16Chen, Blao-ru, A study of RMB Exchange Rate, Ea~t China 
PE!ocigogical College Press, 19.92, p. 42. 
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exchange rate symbolized the relative , comparison between 
the purchasing power of the RMB and that of other 
currencies. 
1n practice, however, the validity of the ppp theory 
ls quite ~uspectful. since the ppp theory assumeS that 
the exchange rate • , I 1S a compar1son of the purchasing 
power t and the pUrchasing power can be reflected in a 
country's price inde~, we can ask the question about the 
PPP's validity "'from a diffe~ent angle: can the price 
index correctly reflect the real purchasing power of a 
currency? 
A review of China's I system indicates the econom1C 
invalidity of the I?PP theory 9 the ln pre-reform era. Under 
the rigid central-planned economic sygtem, prices kept 
stagnant for many years. To show the superiority of the 
socialism, products and services were priced very 
cheaply, making the RMB's nominal purchasing power 
artificially ~igh. The central-planned economy, however, 
caused Ser10US intangible inflation. Although the price 
index was kept stable, the actual demand severely 
~~ceeded the ~ctti~l supply in the matket. In this sense, 
the real purchasing power of RMB was much lower than the 
excharige rate could indicate. Therefore, the ppp theory 
was unworkable 8ecause the nominal purchasing power 
I, 
i , ;.1 ' 
derived from the ,price index could ~: fiot mirror the real 
I 
one. 
Even in the post-reform era, the credibility of the 
ppp was still subj ect to many constraints. When China IS 
~ddno~ic sy~tem was transforming from the certtral-pfanned 
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mode to the market-oriented one; almost everything was 
priced. ' on the tfdouble track", i.e. a planned price and a 
matket price. This complexity of price made it difficult 
to calculate the real purchasing power of the RMB. 
Another factor contributing to the invalidity of the 
ppp W'a~ the incompatibility between China's statistical 
standards and the international ones. While China was 
applying the Material Balance System (MBS) for 
calculating its major , . economlC indices, the National 
Account System (NAS) was widely used in the western 
countries. Owing to the great difference between these 
two systems, any data obtained from the government's 
statistics might ; be insignificant and misleading for 
comparison. 
bue to the very special background irt China, we 
conclude that the government-set official rate; if based 
on the 1?PP theory, could not exactly reflect the real 
purchasing power of the RMB in the past few decades. 
However; the PP1?'s ihvalidity in the past does not ' 
hecessarily mean that it cannot be adopted in the future. 
At present, the Chinese government is gradually releasing 
its controls on prices. If China's price system becomes 
thoroughly market-driven, ahd Chinats statistical 
~tandards become internationally compatible; the RMB's 
nomihal purchasing power derived from the price index 
will be much closer to the real one. Under these 





Exhiblt. I shows that the re-alighment of the RMB 
exchange rate, ih reality; was a p~ocess of the RMB 
deva1uation. Slnce China's introduction of the reform 
policie:3 in . the early 80 j S t the RMB value against the US 
dollar has been · losing from RMB 1.5 to RMB 8.7, with a 
cumulative depreclation of 480 percent to date. 17 Here 
I 
arise the questions: why has it devalued so much? What 
were the impacts ' of the devaluation ob. China's economy? 
How should overseas investors avoid the exchange rate 
ti~k ih China? We will deve~op the answers in this 
chapter. 
Reasons for Devaluation 
Gener~l Background: The Over-valuation of RMB 
Ih chapter four we expounded that China's central-
planned economy had made the :RMB' s nominal purchasing 
power artificially high. since the exchange rate 
r~presented a comparison of the nominal purchasing power 
of the RMB with - that of other currencies, the 
exaggeration of the RMB purchasing power would inevitably 
lead to the overvdluation of the RMB exchange rate. 
Empirical studies al~o proved the overvaluation of 
the RMB exchange rate in the past few decades. By using 
17Solith china Motninq Post, January 1, 1994. 
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an equilibrium exchange rate model, some experts derived 
the "equilibrltim rate u18 of RMB in the period of 1981-
1990. 19 It was found that, when compared with the 
cohtemporary nominal official rates, these "equilibrium 
rates" were much lower in most cases (see Table IV and 
Exhibit Ill). This comparison witnessed that the RMB 
official rate wa~ over-valued. Exhibit IV also gives us a 
clear picture of the RMB over-valuation. Measured by the 
de~iation d~gree~ the nominal official rate always 
deiriated from the "equilibrium rate tr , : and the positive 
figures showed overvaluation. 
No doubt that the RMB over-valuation hindered the 
Chinese governmetlt·~ efforts to promote e~port and 
------=- -~ -' ---
interact with the out~ide world. This problem became more 
apparent when China deepened her marketization progress j 
As a means to correct the o~ervaluation of the p~, 
devaluation turned out to be inevitable. 
~Export Promotion 
Another reason for the devaluation was that China 
wanted to promote her export irtdustry, as a falling yuan 
woUld mak~ export goods cheaper and more competitive. It 
was also Used as Cl tool to cover the exchange earning 
cost, which had been v~ry high due to the Chinese export 
enterprises' inefficiencies and the soaring inflation in 
Chinats domestic market. Take the year 1990 as an 
18E!quil:lbriurrt r "ate refers to the rate which can reflect the 
rei3.1, but not the homl.rtal, purchcHting power of the RMB against that 
of _other currehcies, where the real purchasing power is reflected by 
th~ ~qvilibrium price ~hich " brings demand in line with supply . 
" 19Chen, 13:1..ao- :bl, A study of RMB Exchange Rate, East China 
P~dagpgoca; College Press, 1992, p . 7B-S3. 
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exampl~! in this year, the average exchange earning cost 
of chin'a t El export goods was RMB 5 . 2 per US dollar, 
whereas the average official rate against the US dollar 
in the same period was only RMB 4. 7 .20 Had it not been 
adjusted t the over-valued exchange rate would have 
discouraged china's .exporters dUe to the intolerable 
ejechange. earning cost. Therefore, the RMB devaluation was 
a means of indirect subsidy given by the government to 
support the export companies and cover their exchange 
earning costs, ~specially during the period prior to 
1991. 
A1though the devaluation was inltially adopted by 
the government to realign the RMB real value and to prop 
up Chinats export industry, it was not always so pro-'-
active. Ih fact, the devaluation was partially a reactive 
adjustment driven by other , factors. 
paragraphs will give the details. 
The following 
0nrlation abd Loss of RMB Purchasing Power 
Chirta's escalating inflation was another contributor 
to the devaluation · of the RMB. Parallel to the rapid 
economic growth , ln recent years, the inflation rate 
tnu1tiplied as et result of the overheated investments in 
infrastructure projects and the swollen credit and loans 
supp1ied by China's monetary authority. Exhibit V shows a 
profile of China's runaway ihflation in the past decades, 
~articularly in 1~88f 2~ percent; 1989, 16 percent; and 
1993, 14 percent. The urban inflation rates, especially. 
20 zhahg, tu-xian and ti, ~iei Abpreciation? Depreciation? -- An 
Analysis of Renminbi Exchange Rate, People'S University Press: 
13eij ing; 1992; 1:>. 53. ' 
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in big citles and coastal areas, were even higher than 
these flgt1~es. 
Also indicated in Exhibit V, in contrast to the 
price surges in China; inflation kept mild in western 
countries due to the recent economic recessions and the 
authorities' rigid monetary policies. The difference in 
inflation rates made the RMB and those hard currencies 
mismatched, t;rinirning the purchasing power of the RMB. 
According to the purchasing power parity theory (PPP) , 
any chClnge in relative inflation must result in a 
corresponding ch~nge in exchange rate so as to keep the 
prices of goods in the countries fairly similar. Since 
the RMB purchasing power had been eroded by the sRy-
,i 
rocket inflation, devaluation seemed to be urgently 
need. 
Import Surge and Fore'ign Trade Deficit 
The big increase in import was said to be another 
chief cause of the RMB devaluatior1. 21 Although restricted 
tightly by the government, import demand has never been 
effectively curtailed in China. Given the case where 
import substitutes were very scarce, the expediting 
economic development would inevitably trigger bigger 
domestic appetite for import goods, which in turn created 
an equally sharp rise in demand for the hard currencies 
needed to pay tor import. Take the year of 1993 as an 
example: import jumped by 33 percent to US$105 billion in 
this year, outstripping the slight rise in export by 6 
21Sender, Itenhy, ' ''Famine Amid Feast," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, JanUary 2i, 19,9~. 
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percent to US$91 billion. Consequently, China reported 
her first trade deficit in four years, with a huge 
amount of: U8$14 billion in red. 22 
The burgeoning demand for import and the huge amount 
of trade deficit intensified the mismatch of China's 
forex supply and demand, casting greater pressure on the 
devaluation of the RMB. The devaluation was seen more 
rem~rkable in the Swap centers, wh~re foreign trade 
transactions were settled at the market-driven s~ap rate 
(see Table 11 and Exhibit 11). 
Speculative and Psychological Factors 
On JUne '1 t 1993, China w~s shocked by an overnight 
plurtge of the RMB in swap centers, which drove the swap 
rdte from RMB 8.135 per us dollar down to RMB 10.170 per 
US dollar. 23 This plummet was mainly caused by some 
factors other than those fundamentals discUssed above. 
One reason might be the lifting of the price ceiling 
imposed by _the government in swap centers prior to the 
date, which had kept the swap market too much sluggish 
for several mortths. As the price ceiling was relaxed, it 
ihevit~bly intensified the previously suppressed heavy 
demartd for hard currencies, causing a sharp slide of the 
RMB rate. 24 
The specul~tive and psychological factors 
contributed to this plunge: with the expectation of 
China's re -entry to GATT and a see - saw depreciation of 
22Anbnymoua; "InflcU::.ion has China Running Scared," Business 
W~ek, JUne 1993, _p. 49. 
23Anonymous, China Economic News, External Services Division of 
~8onomic Daily, Juhe 28, 1993. 
2 4 Xbid. 
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the RME rate in the swap market, forex suppliers were 
relucta:'rtt to sell as they wanted to make more RMB profits 
by keeping and then asking at a further depreciated 
rate, 'Whereas demanders scrambled disparately for hard 
currencies so as to hedge against exchange risks or make 
~peculcttive profits. This mismatch between supply and 
clernethd caused the dramatic depreciation of the RMB rate 
in the swap market. 
unification of Dual Rate System 
The reason for the most recent · devaluation of the 
official rate ~t the beginning of 1994 was quite 
s traightf orward ~ It waS a t~S?_hni-_Q~_1 ___ ge~_~_~ ua t _ion as China 
announced the uriification of her dual rate system, making 
the ofticial rate identical ' to the s:o/ap rate, which was 
priced 33 percent lower. This was also consistent with 
China t s bid to re - enter the GATT. As China has lowered 
her overall tariff level to cater for the GATT, the 
governmeht a-pplied. devaluatiori as a means to curb the 
~xpected surge of import demand. 
Impacts of RMB Devaluation 
Table V summarizes the -various impacts of the RMB 
devaluation, either positive or negative; on China's 
external and internal economy. Some of them will be 
highlighted in detail in the following paragraphs. 
External Economy 
A country may adopt devaluation as a means to adjust 
lt~ external economy_ The goal of devaluation is to 
:teE;t::ore the country t s balance of international payments. 
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Improvements in current account ahd capital account can 
be used tbevaluate the effectiveness of devaluation. 
Merchandise Trade Account 
Merchand.ise trade, including both export and import, 
is a mctj or component in current account. As mentioned 
earli~r, devaluation was a strategy that C,hina had been 
adopting to support export and depress import. Hopefully 
this mechanism could improve China's foreign trade 
balance. In reality, however, whether the devaluation can 
play this leverage role lS a complex issue. To better 
understand the eff~cts on the RMB devaluation on China 's 
foreign trade balance, we should first discuss the 
effects on export and import. 
(1) Effects on Export 
Statistics show that the devaluation had positive 
effects on promoting China's export industry. As the RMB 
rate depreciated gradually, China's export value grew 
steadily in the last 14 years. (see Table V~_and Exhibit 
~--'-'--'-. -
VI). In 1993, China '· s export rnarked a new record of US$91 " 
billion. 
Price advantage was the major benefit that the 
devaluation could give to exporters.. However, price is 
only one tactor which may affect demand. Ih reality, the 
buoyant role of th~ ~' devaluation is subj ect to some 
. -11: I ;'. 
,( r :; I I I ' 
constraints, which ~~[~ !l ~la.borctt~d as below: 
; ::. : 
The elasticityap~roach is wideiy used in evaluating 
----'--~-
the effectiveness of devaluation on improving a country's 
foreign trade b&lance. This approach hold~ that the 
improvement of foreign trade balance is a function of 
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four elasticities: 1. The demand elasticity of export 
goods (D*): 2. The supply ~ elasticity of export goods 
(Sx); 3. the demand elasticity of import goods (Dm); and 
4. The supply elasticity of import goods (Srn). 
Since demand plays a dominant role in today's 
international market, the significance of supply 
elasticities of both export goods and import goods can be 
neglected in this case. In other words, supposing the Sx 
~nd Srn are infinite, the effectiveness of devaluation is 
determined by the demand elasticities of export and 
import goods, i.e. Dx and Dm. 
The approach holds that to justify the effectiveness 
of devaluation on promoting export, ' the demand elasticity 
or export , goods, i. e. Dx, must be more than 1. Dx > 1 
implicitly means that the marginal increase in the d~mand 
for export goodEJ exceeds the marginal decrease in the 
prices of export goods, resulted in the amplification in 
export value. Similarly, to justify the effectiveness of 
devaluation on depressing import, the demand elasticity 
of import goods, i.e. Dm, must be greater than 1. Dm > 1 
implies that the marginal decrease in demand for import 
goods outstripa the marginal increase in the prices of 
import goods, wi th the shrinkage in import value as a 
result. In combination of both export and import, a 
country's improvement of foreign trade balance must 
satisfy such a prerequisite as /Dx + Dml > 1,25 which is 
25Whert both import and export are considered simultaneously, it 
is not hecessary that both Dx and Dm must be more than 1 so as to 
improve the foreign trade balance; because the impacts of devaluation 
ori eXport and on import can be offet by each other to some extent. 
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also ca1led the Marshall-Lerner Condition (J.Roblnson: 
1937, L. Metalet! 1948). 
Exhibit VI! may help us get a clear profile of the 
demand elasticity of China's export goods Although 
falling steadily, the primary products, such as 
foodstuffs and oil products, still took 26 percent in the 
compositioh of China's export goods in 1992. The demand 
for these primary export goods was inelastic to the price 
changes result"ed from the RMB devaluation. In other 
words, the cheaper prices of these goods might not 
effectively trigger keener demand for them. A major 
reason behind this inelasticity was the sluggish growth 
in demand as well as the abundant supply of primary goods 
in the international market. 
As for the industrial goods, textile products 
(yarns, woven fabrics; and garments) accounted for the 
biggest item amohg China's export goods portfolio, 
accounting for 27 percent of the total export. 26 The 
demand for these labor-intensiv~ export products was al~o : 
price-inelastic t mainly due to the trade barriers imposed 
by China's trade partners, especially by the us 
government. 
The above illustrations indicate that, although the 
. RM:B devaluation rnay_ help China to promote export, this 
effect might be limited due to the elasticity of China's 
export goods structure. 
26Ima.1, Satoshi, "The structure of Trade in China - Changes and 
Factors, 11 China Newsletter, No. 101, 1992, p. 20. 
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(2) Effects on Import 
Table V! and exhibi t VI show that the RMB 
devaluation could hot effectively depress the domestic 
demand for import goods in the past, especially in the 
years from 1990 to i993. During this period, China's 
import value grew steadiiy and marked the new record at 
US$ 105 billion in 1993. A look at the structure of the 
country' Et import goods ~ay reveal the reasons behind. 
Production mat'~rials took up 80 percent in the 
composl tion of China t s · import goods, and the share of 
industrial import products, including hi-tech goods and 
durable consumer goods, surged rapidly in recent years 
due to the acceleration of China's economic development. 27 
In 1992, the total manufactured goods took up 84 percent 
iti China's import structure (see Exhibit VIII). Given the 
situation where the domestic sUbstitutes were still very 
scarce, the demand for these import goods was price-
inelastic, th~t is to say, they were ln urgent need for 
the country t s economic development whatever the import 
COEtts would be. As a result, the devaluation could not 
help China to control import demand. 
(j) Effects on, Foreign Trade Bal~nce 
To this end we have developed two arguments: one is 
that the RMB devaluation had positive but limited effect 
oh promoting export, the other is that the RMB 
de~alu~tion did not have v~ry influehtial effect on 
depress:Lng import. Based on these two arguments, we 
cbrtcltide that the effect of the RMB devaluation on 
211bld. 
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improvihg Chinats foreign trade balartce was 
ihgigtlificant. 1\ review of China's trade records in the 
past 14 years can solidify our conclusion: from 1980 to 
1993, the' increases in export value always went along 
with the ihcreages in impo'rt value, and import growth 
oU tpaced . export growth in tnos teases. As a resul t , the 
foreigh trade balance could not be improved in a 
coh~i9teht way. In particular, during the period from 
1990 to 1993, " when both the official rate and the swap 
rate depreciated substantially, China's foreign trade 
balance turned around from the surplus of US$ 8.7 billion 
to the deficit of US$ 14 billion, .which evidenced the 
insignificant effect of the devaluation on restoring 
China I El foreign trade balance (see Table VI and Exhibit 
VI) . 
Other Considerations 
In the above section we expounded the effect of the 
RMB devaluation on China's foreign trade balance based on 
the elasticity approach. Actually; we can draw the same 
conclusion from other perspectives, which are illustrated 
as below! 
(1) Time Lags 
Usually there are time lags to see impacts of the 
RMB devaluation. DUe to the lack of information, both 
importers and exporters may not instantly recogrtize the 
price changes resulted from devaluation, and it takes 
time for them to make purchasing decisions, to arrange 
ptoduction, t ·o deliver goods} etc. When credit terms are 




,: devaluation must be carried out at the old prices, making 
the devct1u<ition unable to instahtly affect the demands 
for export goods and import goods. 
All of these time lags made the impact of 
devaluation to be insigniticartt at the initial stage. On 
. the corttrary, it is not uncommon that et country's foreign 
. trade balance exacerbates in the early days after the 
deva1uatioh, because export · goods are settled at lower 
prices and ittipoit goods are settled at higher prices but 
the volumeEl of both . import and export do not change 
substantially. As time goes by, when the devaluation has 
significantly affected the demands for import and export, 
the improvement of foreign trade balance will become more 
ahd more ctpparerit. This phenomena is depicted as "J curve 
effect" . 
oWlng to the time lags, China could not improve her 
foreign trade balance right after the announcement of 
devaluation. It takes times for the RMB devaluation to 
alter the demands for China's export and import goods. 
(2) The fragmentation in China's Foreign Trade Industry 
China t s foreign trade industry was very fragmented 
after the deregUlation in the middle 1980's. It was not 
unusual that different Chinese exporters competed with 
one another for selling the same products to the same 
cohstimers t and price cutting was a widely used tactics 
rar them to gain deals. Therefore, the severe cut in 
prices might ~ote or lesS offset the increase in demand, 
making the effect of . the devaluation insignificant. On 
the import side; there were few co-ordinations amongst 
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importers • ln different areas. For example, 12 
rerrigerator assembly lines were imported by different 
provincial import companies in 1988, but none of them 
could reach the economic scale. 28 These blind and improper 
lmport~ off~eted the benefit of the RMB devaluation on 
depressing import demand and improving foreign trade 
. balance .. 
Non-Trade Ctirr~nt Account 
(1) Touri~m 
Tourism is the f maJor source of China's forex 
earning~ from hon-trade account. Table VII and Exhibit IX 
show that the RMB devaluation attracted more foreign 
tourists, as the weaker RMB saved their expenses on 
traveling in Chlna. The forex generation from tourism has 
grown steadily since 1985, except a plunge in 1989 due to 
the Tiananmen Square Incident. 
While admitting the positive effect of the RMB 
' devaluation 6n boosting tourism, we should note that the 
upsurge of foreign exchange income from tourism was also 
'affected by other factors, such as the quality of 
service; and the operation . cost, which could either 
strengthen or weaken the leverage role of devaluation. : 
(i) Quality of Service! Besides the expenditure 
ractor, the good quality of service is another crucial 
factor to attr~ct foreign tourists. If China could 
Upgrade the service quality of her tourist industry, the 
28WU~ Mit1~ "Takl.t1g Note of the Economies of Scale While 
Introducing Facilities", China Trade, November, 1990, p. 23. 
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benefit of devaluation is expected to be 
strengthened. 
(ii) Operation Cost: The dropping exchange rate 
raised the operation cost of tourism, in particular some 
prestigious hotels, because they must import facilities 
and materials more expensively. If they cope with the 
ihcreasing operation cost by raising rental and other 
relevant . fees ~ the price advantage of the falling RMB 
will be weakened~ 
(2) Other Items in Non-Trade Account 
Besides tourism, the RMB devaluation affected other 
items in non- trade account. Similar .to its leverage role 
in promoting export, the depreciatingRMB made the export 
of labor and service cheaper and more competitive. Table 
VIII and Exhibit X show that the forex earnings from 
contracted projects and lab'or service export have 
maintained healthy growth in the past decade, reflecting 
the positive. role of the RMB devaluation. With the 
authority's gradual relaxation on foreign exchange 
control, the dev~luation also increased remittances from 
overseas Chinese~ The falling rate t however, increased 
the cost of technology transfer, thus hindered the 
progress of introducing advanced technologies. 29 
Capital Account 
Table IX and Exhibit XI show that China's 
utilization of foreign capital grew steadily in the last 
14 years (except the plunge in 1989 and 1990 due to the 
290verlooking the Lybrinth: A study of Renminbi Exchange Rate, 
~d. by Shanghai Asian ~~search In~titute~ Sahlian! Hong Kong, 1993. 
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Tiananmen Square Incident). This indicates the positive 
effect on the RMB devaluation on attracting foreign 
investments, as the weaker RMB rate saved foreign 
investors' costs. Not only did the RMB devaluation enable 
foreign investors to get larger proportion of equity 
~h~re~ in joint v~ntures by investing the same am6unt of 
hard currency, but it also lowered the investors' 
operation costs, such as the expenditure on land, labor, 
and domestic sourcing f making the investments in China 
more economical and profitable. 
The devaluation, however, did not have an across-
the-board effect on enticing foreign investment. In fact, 
it might bring advantages or disadvantages to foreign 
investors, depending on which -industry the foreign 
investments were engaged in. 
Export-oriented foreign investment bertefited a lot 
from the devaluation due to the reduction in operation 
cost and the competitive edge gained from the cheaper 
prices of their export products. The profit was immune to 
the devaluation because it was denominated in hard 
currency. 
Enterprises engaged in export processing businesses 
might suffer to some ' extent from the increasing cost of 
imported raw material and componehts. Although the income 
was immune to the exchange rate exposure as it was 
denominated in hard currertcy, 
decrease. 
the profit margin would 
The devaluation brought devastating consequences to 
investors who needed to turn their inconvertible RMB 
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earnings into h~rd currency at the falling rate, for 
their material sourcing, salary payment, and profit 
repatriation. Major victims were those companies who 
relied heavily on domestic sales of import goods, such 
companies were found in the retail, service, and property 
irtdustries. Their profits in terms of RMB were 
substantially eroded after translating into hard 
currency. Examples were such Hong Kong companies as 
Goldlionf Giord~no, Cafe de Coral and Fairwood, just to 
name a feW. 30 
EqUity investors in China's B shares were also hurt 
as their capital gains and dividends were settled at the 
falling swap rate. In addition, the sharp devaluation of 
the RMB rate make China's equity market less attractive 
to foreign players. 
As illustrated above, the RMB devaluation had 
crucial implications to foreign investors. To succeed 
their investment in China, they must develop the means to 
hedge against the capricious exchange rate risks. We wili 
discuss some feasible strategies later on. 
other Couhtries' Response: The Blame of Manipulation 
Another effect of the RMB devaluation on China f s 
external economy migh,t be the blame of "Exchange Rate 
Manipulation" respon-ded by the United states and other 
western couhtries. As claimed by the semi-annual report 
of the us TreasUry Department, China has manipulated her 
currency to gain an unfair trade advantage, 
3°Andnyroous, "Los:ing Money in China," Singapore Business, 
september 1993, p. 46. 
which 
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Washington attributed to the US$18.3 billion trade 
deficit with China in 1992. 31 No doubt that this friction 
would hinder the smooth development of China's foreign 
trade relationship with her western partners. If the US 
government exerts any retaliation, it would hurt China's 
export industry drastically. 
Internal.Economy 
Imported Inflation 
Exchange rate is the thread connecting the prices of 
both domestic and import goods. Any change in exchange 
rate will inevitably lead to the change in price. 
statistics shows that the RMB devaluation went along 
with the runaway inflation in China (see Exhibit V). The 
plunge of the RMB rate was said tb be a contributor to 
pushirtg tip the price index in the domestic market. The 
weaker RMB triggered cl cha'ln of "imported inflation", 
since it had increased the costs of import material and 
products, which would be transferred to the ultimate 
con9umers by raising selling prices in the domestic 
market. This imported inflation is expected to get worse 
in the near future due to the convergence of the dual 
rate system., As it will increase the costs of some import 
goods, which were entitled to be settled at the favorable 
rate. 
butt" 'rl6w must be settled at the lower new 
···.IW'!ii,i,: 
official rate, 
Moreover, the weaker RMB intensified the high 
inflation in china;, Export expansion implies that some 
311\nonytnous, "US T:t~asury Report Accuses China of Manipulating 
Cur~ericy," Asian Wall street Journal t May 27, 1993 .~ 
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domestic resources are switched to satisfy external 
demand at the sacrifice of internal demand. Since a 
bottle-neck between supply and demand still exist in 
china's economy, such an extraction of reSource for 
export promotion intensified the mismatch between supply 
and demand in the internal market, thus putting more 
inflationary pressures on the prices of domestic goods. 32 
Devaluation and ihflation, rather than a cause-
~ffect: relatiOl1, interact with each other in a spiral 
route. Resulted from devaluation, the imported inflation 
eroded the RMB purchasing power, which would in turn 
trigger a hew round of devaluation. 
Import Substitution Industry 
The RMB devaluation might bring a wedge for China's 
import substitution , industry to grow. The intolerable 
costs of import products drove many firms to switch to 
internal gourcing, given the assortment and quality of 
the domestic sUbstitutes could meet the international 
standardg. This shift gives China an opportunity to 
develop her import substitution industry, which is 
beneficial for employment and economic growth. In 
reality, mahy developing countries follow this mode as an 
economic strategy_ 
People's Faith in the RMB 
The plunge of the RMB exchange rate hurt people's 
confidence in the RMB value. To hedge against the loosing 
value, people tended to scramble desperately for hard 
32 Zhang, Yu-xlan and Li, Xie, Appreciation? Depreciation? -- An 
Analysis of Renminbi Excha:nge Rate, People's University Press: 
Beijing, .1992, p. 79. 
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currencies. This psychological crisis was even 
exacerbated by the speculators' profiteering activities. 
An apparent example was the big bang occurred in the swap 
centers in mid-1993: Driven by these psychological and 
speculative factors, the swap rate dropped by 25 percent 
overnight. 33 
Having elaborated the various effects of the RMB 
devaluation, we can see that evaluating the RMB re-
aligt1tt1ent is ~!a very complex issue. The depreciation is 
like a dual-edge sword; it has both advahtages and 
disadvantages. Since the exchange rate interacts with 
other factors fUhctioning in the dynamic economy, the 
devaluation itself is not a panacea to solving China's 
ecortomic problems. In other words, a healthy macro-
economic environment is the key to optimizing the roles 
of the RMB devaluation. To t ,his end, China should take 
various supplementary measures to improve her macro-
economy. We will discuss this issue in detail in chapter 
seven. 
Practical Implications of RMB Devaluation:Strategies 
for Hedging against Forex Risk 
The complexity and volatility of the RMB exchange 
rate have become one of the greatest challenges to 
foreign ihvesto~s who ~ish to do business in China. The 
exchange rate fluctuations altered foreign investors' 
cost structure and profit forecast, and hurt their 
enthu~iasm about investing in China. Therefore, it is 
33Ano11yritotil:1, "When Ceiling Moves Out," China Economic News, 
June 1993; p. 1. 
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truly in need that some meaningful strategies should be 
developed for hedging against the RMB rate exposures. 
Some of them are elaborated as follows: 
Agreement with Chinese Side 
The so- called "side agreement" is one method widely 
used by foreign irtvestors who wish to set up joint 
ventures in China" Although the government states that 
the official -' rate is the only applicable rate to joint 
ventut"es, in practice, most Chinese companies and most 
local authorities seeking foreign partners are flexible 
on the exchange rate issue, agreeing' what rate to use is 
a crucial part of negotiation between the two parties. 
Therefore, before signing contracts, foreign investors 
can negotiate with the Chinese side ;for a fixed exchange 
rate to be used in settlements of bo~h capital investment 
ctnd investment return. This side-agreement transfers the 
exchange risk to the Chinese partners or local 
authorities,- making the foreign investors itnrrtune to the 
RMB's fluctuation. 
For~x-Guaranteed Loan 
Foreign investors can also hedge against their forex 
risk by using the forex-guaranteed " RMB loans. Foreign 
businesses need some local currency to pay for the 
expenses of their daily operations in China. A formal way 
to meeting this heed i~ to convert their hard currencies 
from the state· banks ot" in the swap market. However, 
foreign investors may surfer a lot from this conversion, 
given the situation where the RMB' s rate is expected to 
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'plummet further. The forex -guaranteed RMB loan is a good 
' alternative to hedge agafnst this risk: Foreign investors 
should first deposit the US dollars at the Bank of China 
as collateral. A line of credit in the RMB is then given 
to them and the RMB deposit will be credited to the same 
account. The RMB loan meets the investors· needs for 
payir1g daily operation expenses and relaxes them from the 
trouble of converting hard currencies. Although this 
method will incur interest payments . on the RMB loan, 
compared with the dollar loss which might result from the 
. t '. plunge of exchange rate, It is stlll very safe and 
economical. 
blversification of Business 
As mentioned earlier, the RMB devaluation may caUse 
different consequences to foreign investors, depending 
on which kind of business the'y are engaged in. A well 
diversified business portfolio is a wise means to hedge 
~gainst the exchange rate risk, since the negative 
impacts of the devaluation on some bUsinesses might be 
offset by the po~itive impacts on the other ones. 
Forex Future Market 
Forex future market is the most ideal place where 
investors can hedge against their exchange rate risks. In 
thls market, investors can use various strategies, such 
as hedging, swap, and spreading; to irrmunize their 
exposures to the, exchange rate fluctuation. The use of 
forex future market becomes possible because the Chinese 
government has established a standardized, nation-wide 
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forex market in April, 1994. The emergence of forex 
market , I ," g1ves chance to JVs to make forex future 
cohtr~ct~ ~ith state banks so as to lower their exchange 
risks. If the Chinese government can accelerate and 
improve the legislations for regulating the forex market, 
foreign investors will become more confident in fueling 
money i11 China. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PROSPECT OF THE RMB EXCHANGE RATE 
As :Lrtdicated • In the j prevlous chapters, China is 
making herexchallge rate system more market-driven, and 
has announced .,. that the ultimate goal of her currency 
reform I lS to realize the free convertibility of RMB. 
However, there ar~ still many problems unexplored. The 
prospect of the RMB's rate has drawn many people's 
concerns: How credible is the new exchange rate system? 
wh~re is the RMB' s rate heading . in near future? 
Appreciation or Depreciation? How to achieve the goal of 
:f:r~e convertibility? ... We will develop the answers in 
this chapter. 
Expectation of the RMB Exchange Rate: 
A Move in the Near Future 
As mehtion~d earlier, China converged her two-tier 
rate sy~tem and established a Ijmanaged- floating single 
rate system u in early 1994. Since then, China's central 
bank has managed to stabilize the unified rate at RMB 
A.70 per us dol1ar. _ Ho~ever, it is too early to say that 
the RMB rate has reached et sustainable level. In the 
n~ar future t the credibility or viability of the new 
syst~m will mainly depend on the following two factors: 
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Forex Demand vs. Forex Supply 
Market force will be the maj or determinant of the 
market-driven R.M::8 rate. Based on many factors, such as 
the over-heated economy, the surge in import, and the bid 
to re-enter GATT, we expect that China's keen demand for 
foreign exchange will continue in near future. 
On the supply side, China's export potential will 
become doubtful, if the MFN ; lssue cannot be settled 
smoothly. China cannot rely ort international borrowing to 
incredse forex supply either, since it has already 
reached the peak of repaying foreign debts in recent 
years. 
Therefore, it is believed that, in the coming years, 
forex de~and will outstrip fo~ex supply in China. If this 
mismatch leaves unadjusted i it may not be easy for the 
central bank to stabilize the floating rate effectively. 
The limited amount of foreign exchange reserve will aiso 
constrain the central bank f S ability to stabilizing the 
RME value. All these cohtribute to the foreseeabl'e 
fUrther devaluation of the RMB rate. 
Inflation 
The runaway inflation rate in China is another 
factor contributing ,to the uncertainties of the RMB rate. 
The sky- rocket inflation rate i which is running as much 
as 39 percent in many big cities,34 has substantially 
eroded the purchasing power of the RMB. Being unconfident 
ih the RMB value, people will scramble . for ' hard 
34At1onymous, "Ihflation has China Running Scared l!, Business . 
. Week, March 20; 1994.. · 
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currencies as a hedging measure. This will force down the 
RME rate. 
Therefore, if China fails to improve her balance of 
international payment and to curb the high inflation, the 
market-driven RMB rate is likely to go down further in 
the near future. In order to ensure the stability and 
credibility of the RMB rate, the chinese government must 
strengthen the management of forex supply and demand, and 
~dopt a more deflationary approach to guide the country's 
economy. 
Free convertibility of RMB 
Lifting foreign exchange controls as well as 
realizing the RMB free convertibility is the ultimate 
goal of Cpina's currency reform.35 The . recent abolition of 
the dual rate sy§tem, in reality, was the first step to 
reach this goal. : Implementing' the managed- floating rate 
system symbolizes the limited convertibility of the RMB 
in current _ account transactions, which is a very 
primitive stage of free convertibility.36 Experts hold 
that, however, it is still far away from a ripe time to 
make the RMB fully convertible. In this part, we will 
discuss the definition, roles, premises, and feasible 
procedures for realiz~ng the RMB convertibility. 
Definition 
Simply put, free convertibility means that both 
residents and non-residents in a country can exchange 
35.Artonyrrtbua, "Pree Exchange of mm Seen as Beneficial to 
F;cor1oml.c RIse," china Daily, June 12, 1993. 
. 36Chan, thomaF.l, "A Year of Big Change for the Yuan," South 
Chlha Mothihct ~ost; J~nuary 2, 1994. 
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that couhtry's currency for other cUrrencies without any 
restrictiotl. According to the coverage of free 
convertibility, it can be further divided into the 
fo1lowing two categories: 37 
!nternal Convertibility 
Internal convertibility allows domestic residents 
arid enterp-rises to freely obtain and hold assets 
denominated in foreign currencies. It should be noted 
that this convertibility is confined within the domestic 
foreigrt exchange market. The goverrtmerit exerts controls 
over the , payments , of import and the outflows of forex 
capital. 
External . Convertibility 
Going bey'ohd the above coverage, external 
convertibility allows the free exchange of home currency 
for foreign > ' • currenCles in both current account and 
capital account. The current account convertibility is an 
obligation based upon Article 8 of the International 
Monetary Fund Agreement (IMFA), stating that any IMF 
member country should lift the control over foreign 
exchange used for payments in current account. 38 Capital 
account convertibility, which allows free international 
transf~r of forex capital, is the last step to make a 
currency fully convertible. It implies that all of the 
g"overnmerttts controls over foreign exchange are removed. 
37overlookinq the Lybrinth: A study of Renminbi Exchange Rate, 
Ed. by Shartghai Asian Research Institute, sanlian: Hong Kong, 1993, 
p~ 10 . . ' ' 
38 I bid. 
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I Pros and Cons of RMB Convertibility 
FUll convertibility of the RMB is seen as vital to 
the further development of China's economy. The internal 
convertibility will crack the rampant black foreign 
exchange marketf:j by encouraging people to deposit their 
hard . , currenCles • ln the state banking system, which in 
turn strengthens the government's ability , to obtaining 
~hd allocaiing foreign exchange. The ' external free 
convertibility will improve China's foreign trade 
relation with her western partners, as the goverriment 
releases its forex corttrol on the payments of import. The 
free convertibility represents an improvement of the 
country's investment environment, thus it will attract 
more foreign investor to china and widen Chinats economic 
co-operation with other countries. The external 
convertibility a1so requires 'China to open her financial 
market to the outside world; and this will expedite the 
reform of China's banking system <:i.nd improve the 
efficiency of her financial institutions. In addition, l~ 
may increase the RMB credibility in the world, and 
accelerate the internationalization of RMB . 
However, the full convertibility will also cause 
~ome uncertainties: If the RMB value is unstable and 
people lose th~ir - confidence, they will rush for hard 
currencies to hedge:':' ~~ainst the exchange rate exposures, 
which will in turrl deplete China's forex reserve. 
Additionally, it will bring difficulties for the 
government to manage the flow of forex capital, and will 
. , 
57 
make the RMB rate more vulnerable to the unexpected 
cOhtingencies in the international money market. 
Prerequisites to RMB Convertibility 
China has not yet set a definite timetable for 
realizing the free convertibility of RMB. The government 
holds that several prerequisites must be met to make the 
RMB convertible. As stated by a senior official in the 
Peopleis Bank of China (PBOC) i there are four 
prerequisites to realizing the RMB convertibility:39 
Rational Exchanqe Rate 
A. rational exchange rate is said to be the most 
fundamental pre-condition to the RMB full convertibility. 
An over-valued . exchange rate will make it difficult for 
exporters to compete with their foreign counterparts; 
whereas ah under-valued exchange rate will increase 
import costs; which will eventually slowdown the 
introduction of advanced technology and the development 
of economy_ To rationalize the exchange rate, it must be 
market oriented, and mirror the real supply and demand 
relation in the foreign exchange market, since the market 
force is an "invisible hand it to restore equilibrium. To 
achieve the free convertibility, this rate should also be 
helpful for China to balance her international payments. 
Sufficient Intern~tional Settlement Means 
International settlement means refer to a country's 
foreign exchange reserves and her ability to raise forex 
fUhds ' in the international capital markets. The free 
39 :l . < rb d, p. 75,-78. 
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convertibility requires that China should develop various 
m~an~ to satisfy th~ demand for foreign exchange. To this 
end; china . must maintain SUfficient foreign exchange 
reserves, as the free convertibility may trigger keener 
domestic demand for hard currencies. The sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves will also reinforce ' the 
governnient . intervention in the money market, which is 
very important for the stabilization of the ,RMB. 
Sound Macroec6nomicPolicies 
The free ,convertibility requires China to establish 
a healthy macroeconomic framework, under which the 
economy can keep ort growing steadily. Inflation cover is 
the most important step in this regard, as it determines 
peoplets faith in the value of the RMB. 
Efficient Microecortomic Environment 
The free convertibility may introduce keener 
competitlort from foreign companies. Facing this 
challenge, the domestic enterprises must sharpen their 
competitive edge~ for survival and success. Therefore, a 
healthy microeconomic environment, which can vigorate the 
Chinese enterprises and improve their efficiencies, is an 
inseparable prereqUisite to the realization of free 
convertibility. 
It is very obvious that China's current economic 
situation I lS far away from satisfying these 
prerequi~ites. The recent unification of the dual rates, 
atld the implementation of the managed-floating rate 
systefu welcomed steps towards the RMB 
convertibili ty. However, the credibili ty of this system 
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needs to be tested, and it is too early to say the 
current managed-floating rate is a rational one. 
Table X and Exhibit XII show that China lacks 
sUfficient foreign exchange reserves to make the RMB 
freely convertible. Although having reached a historical 
new record in 1993" China's foreign exchange reserve was 
stili et tiny number of U8$27 billion (excluding the 
foreign exchange assets of the Bank of China). To meet 
the normal demand for foreign currencies, it is a general 
practice that a country shoUld maintain her forex reserve 
level above three months' import value. 40 Given the 
average monthly import of US$12 billion in the first two 
months of this year t 41 China's foreign exchange reserve is 
insufficient to : meet the import demand, not to say 
demands from other dimensions! 
China;s overheated macro 'economy is another obstacle 
to the RMB convertibility. The runaway urban inflation of 
39 percent4~ in the first quarter of this year has 
signaled the government's failure to cool down her 
economy. This Cistonishing inflation rate hurt people's 
confidence in the RMB value, and the black forex market 
in China i~ very prevailing. 
Chinese enterprises, especially the large size state 
enterprises; usually lack efficiencies and profitability 
dUe to the drawbacks left over by the central-planned 
economic syEjtem. The poor performances of state 
enterprises bring more difficulties for China to realize 
40 bi ' I d, p. 76. 
41Chiha Trade, March i994, p. 52. 
42 s tate statistical Bureau Quarterly Report, April 1993. 
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the RMB free convertibility, because a convertible RMB 
will make import much easier, which in turn will force 
Chinese enterprises to compete with powerful foreign 
competitors. 
Procedures for Realizing Full Convertibility 
In short, the ' current situation in China implies 
that the realization of the RMB convertibility must be a 
long and tortuous course, because the above premises are 
not yet satisfied. To realize the free 
convertibility, the following measur~s should be taken: 
Eliminating the bual Rate System 
The abolition of the dual rate 'system is the first 
step to realize the full convertibility of the RMB 
because it is urtfeasible to excIJange one currency for 
ahother at different rates. China has completed this step 
\ 
by unifying the dual rate system at the beginning of 
1994. 
Realizihg the Limited Convertibility of RMB 
The implementation of the single rate system 
indicates the limited convertibility of the RMB. Having 
ptlt an end to the retention of foreign exchange earnings 
and the existence of forex swap centers, the single 
fioating rate system embodies the supply-demand relations 
of foreign ~xchange and may reflect the real value of the 
RMB. Under this circumstance, there is no need for 
enterprises to sell - their forex retention at the 
negotiated rate irtswap centers, instead, they are 
obliged to sell all of their forex earnings to state 
61 
banks at the floating official rate. When the enterprises 
need forex for making payments of import or for other 
purposes, they may buy from state banks with "valid 
documents t, • 
!n this regard, the RMB becomes partially 
cohvertible in current account transactions because the 
governrnentts administrative control over foreign 
exchange, which was previously undertaken by the State 
AdrrtirlistrCltiorr for Exchange Control (SAEC), has been 
weakehed. By presenting some "valid documents" 
enterprises can buy forex directly from state banks 
instead of submitting applications to the SAEC in 
advance. However, this is just ct limited convertibility, 
not only because the coverage is still confined within a 
narrow range in current account, but also because some 
valid documents are still in need for buying foreign 
currencies. In other words, the government still exerts 
controls over foreign exchange transactions. 
It should be noted that the valid documents, such as 
import licenses and import contracts; are issued or 
approved by foreign trade department rather than by the 
SAEC. In this context, the government's control over the 
demand for forex is shifted from the direct regulatory 
body of SAEC to the foreign trade department. Wi th the 
hope that China will free the domestic market after her 
1 
re-entry to GATT, the control over import is expected to 
be further relaxed in future. Therefore, the coverage of 
this limited conv~rtibility will become broader and 
62 
broader, leading to a smooth transition to the full 
convertibility in current account. 
Establishing Foreign Exchange Market 
The opening of foreign exchange 
complementary measure to facilitate free 
of the RMB. In co-ordination with the 
market is a 
convertibility 
single floating 
rate system j China announced to build up a standardized 
nationwide foreign exchange market in April, . 1994. 
The forei'gn exchange market is composed of the 
central bank, foreign exchange banks t industrial and 
commercial enterprises, and individuals. The central bank 
is the major participant in the forex market, performing 
formulatory and supervisory functions. It shall also be 
re~ponsible for ~tabilizing the exchange rate. 
The forex market can be divided into two parts: One 
is the market among forex banks, the other is the market 
between rorex banks and private business entities. 
The market among fore~ banks functions like a 
wholesale market. The headquarters banks may enter the 
international forex market to buy or sell both spot and 
forward exchanges according to customer's need. Branch 
banks can do exchange business in China to adjust their 
balance positions. 
The market between forex banks and private 
businesses is like a retail market. Enterprises and 
individuals may open forex account with or sell forex to 
the bartks without restriction. When in need, they may buy 
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forex from the banks with or without authority's 
approval, depending on the goverhrnent's policy.43 
~lifulhatirtdth~ Poreign Exch~nge certificates (FgCS) 
~li~itl~tibn of th~ F~C is another ~e~sure to 
cothpletrt~nt:. with the cOhvertibility. Th~ FEe 
furtctidhediike a bridge cotlhecting the noh- convertible 
. . kM13 ~tld fdr~igh ' currencies 4 !t was used by toreigners, 
ffi&ihiy tbuiists, for their payments in China and was 
ddrtvert~d for -" torex when they left china. Gi "\ten the RMB 
to b~ cbhvertibl~j there is no heed for using the FEC any 
tttdre ~ Fdreigners :rnay go to the forej(: banks to change the 
kMB at th~ Official rate; ana their expenditure in China 
i~ prit~d ih th~ , do~~~tic ctirrertcy. 
Aliowing tr~e Tt&risf~r of For~idn Exbhang~ in capital 
AccoUttt 
As m(§t1tiot1ed in the definition of cotivertibility, 
bpehing chin~t§c~pit~i ~~rket~ which allows foreign 
Ebtcha.t1ge c~pital to be t:t~hsferred freely to and from 
China, l~ the iast step to reach the goal of China's 
eUrr~tlcy :t~form~ Ohce the control over interrtational 
crcthsfer of fotex capital lS relaxed, the RMB's will 
embody the real rt1~aning of "fu1ly convertible". 
Rowever t given the current situation where foreign 
~~chatlg~ i~ §till ~c~rce in China, it is not a ripe time 
to itnpletrtertt the :RMB convertibility in capital account . 
. Although aifuing at this uitimate goal, currently the 
~ove:t11fuet1t: should t3till exercise rigid management over 
43W~t1g i d"lah, _ If China arirtgs up Greater Effort to Unify Exchange 
MAtkett " thihA Ecbhomic News, Match 29, 1993 ~ 
I .. 
I ; . 
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lhternAtldtlai bor~bwing and overseas investment, so as to 
~:ltcutrt\h~tH:: the bUt.:floW' of foreign exchange capital ahd to 
aileviate the heavy burden of external debts. If the 
governm~tltt~ forelgn exchange reserves are hot sUfficient 
td guaraht:~~ the balance of itlternatiohal payments, the 
f:t~e Cdhv~tt:ibility . in capital account will caUse 
a~vastatitlg CbtlSequertces to ·the economy. 
the realizatioh of RMB's free 
' tbri-v-ettlbilitt is et very complex project which cannot be 
~cdompl i~hed : overnight. As cbhlhtented by Mr. Yang Gongl ill, 
a. ~eriidr official in .the sA.~C: 
. tiThe fr~e cohv-~rtibility of rertminbi is a target of 
ehitlats :f:ih&l1cia.l · :r~fo:tttL lIdWever j it is a long ahd 
t.b:tttioUi:l way : to ~b • Tb r~ach the tehninal i we have to 
~6dUh\Ul:3.te . sUffitd_eht fdreign _ exchange reserves i arid 
~hc1rp~h the bompeti ti ve edges of oui export irtdUs tries; 
W~ hav~ to §~tabli~h ~ h~alth1 dome~tit market mechanism 
Atld aCbfuprehen~iv~ leg~l etlvirotlmertt; . we have to create 
. a tatidriAl price §ysterrt 21tld a , flexible; market driven, 
sir1g1~ exchittige rAte system; ~.. .... Only when we have 
~a.tisri~d th~~e 2()nc1itiotl~ j can we implement the free 
. convertibility of :tetirrtihbi. u44 
:. ' . 44d1~:t186Riri.d . th~ Lybrinth: A Study of ~ehmil1.bi Excha~ge Rate; ' ~J ~ .. by shAnghAi AtJiAtl ~ese~rch It1stitut~, Sanlian: Hong Kong, 1993~ 
.p l ~1 . 
i · . ' 
I . 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 
In the I prevlous chapters we have discussed the 
various issue~ of the currency reform in China, including 
the arrangement, devaluatioh, and prospect of the RMB 
exchange rate. To , this end, we might have got the whole 
picture of the dramatic changes in the RMB exchange rate 
system and its comprehensive impacts on China's economy. 
We have also caught the direc~ion of the R11B reform in 
future. Therefore I we have developed the means to draw 
our conclusion and recommendations to end this study. The 
details are as follo"ws: 
A Rational Managed-Floatirtg Rate System is in Need 
The acceleration of China's, marketization program 
requires a compatible exchange rate system which can play 
its equilibrium role in modifying the economy. ,Having 
eXperiertced more than ten years' rectification of the RMB 
vaiue and endured the vatioug impacts on the ecortomYt the 
RMB exchange rate system is moving laboriously closer to 
the fUlcrtim to fulfill its leverage roles. With the 
impiementa.tioli of the managed-floating single rate system 
ih 1994 ~ the gover11n1ertt IS eftort now is to build up a 
GG 
rational ~xchartg~ rate mechanism which is not only 
tlexible ertbugh to reflect the supply-dem~nd relation in 
the forex market, but also controllable enough to ensure 
the stability atld credibility of the home currency. 
Under the name of "managed floating rate system", 
~----------- -. _---_._--- -.- -'-' - '" 
the ~ord tifloating" embodies the feature of flexibility. 
~e:tther artificially over-valued nor urtder-valued 
exchange rate is good for the country's economy. Instead, 
the ratiortai :tate must be determined by the "invisible 
hand" in the market, i. e.. the actual relationship of 
~upply and demand. Only when the system becomes so 
flexible that it complies with the market rules, can it 
reflect the equilibrium level of the RMB. Consequently, 
it also deserveEJ the real meaning of uma.rket economy". 
Given the current economic conditions in China, 
however, any sharp swing in the exchange rate would bring 
devastating consequences to the country's fledgling 
market economy_ The exchange rate system, thereby, should 
be controllable enough 80 as to ertsure the smooth and' 
harmonious development of the economy. Assuming the 
economic fUndarnerltals remain unchanged, the authority 
should guarantee that the move of exchange rate falls 
within a pre-determined spectrum. under the name of 
"managed floating system", the word "managed" depicts 
I . . 
this feature of :t~lativ~ stability _ Tb avoid the short-
- - ----- - ,------ ---~.-----
arid irrational fluctuations in exchange 
rate, the central bank should take some intervening 
Actions in case of contingencies. However, these actions 
~hotild be economic ra.ther than administrativ:e ones. 
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How to recohc:i.le the contradiction between 
fieJtibility d.nd stability is a quite subtle issue. The 
_ ___ M---. ___ . _______ "--__ . __ . 
recent data show that China has managed to stabilize her 
exchange rate at RMB 8.7 pe! US dollar since the 
--------_ ... .--..--. - ,;:] ~/ f'; , 
un:i.ficatiort at the beginning I~this ' year. The very narrow 
floating range lmplies that the Chinese government 
overemphasizes the stability of the RMB rate. This 
method, nevertheless, is quite controversial. If the 
stabilized race is so rigid that it deviates from the 
real supply and demand relation in the market, or if the 
government applies administrative rather than economic 
approaches to ac~ieve this stability, the RMB rate system 
I 
will return to the old one, and the over-valuation at the 
RMB as well as l the rampaht black forex market will 
inevi tably take i place agairt. Therefore, we think that, 
while admittihg' the importance of stability, the 
governmerit shou1d also recoghize the significance of 
flexibility, and take some measures to make the rate more 
fle~ible. An enlargement of the floating range is thought' 
a~ a meaningful ~ay. 
Devaluation lE! not a Panacea 
As indicated in the • elaboration, the RMB prevlous n ___ '. _____ 
devaluation 
; 
itself • not to remedy the illness 1~ a panacea 
'--- ~----,-. - "--- ... ------.. --
of the China's , external and internal economy. In an 
integrtited economic environment, the roles o:e devC?-luation 
&re subject to numerous constraints. The past experience 
has proved that the RMB devaluation cannot definitely 
... ------~---
. improve chl:tia.' , S b~lance of irtternational payments, nor 
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can it surely benefit the country's internal economy. How 
, - ---- -- ---- .. --"----,-,,- - -"". 
to make the exchange rate more effective in playing its 
leverage roles is a big challenge that China's policy 
makers are facing now. To this end, the establishment of 
a healthy macoreconomic environment is necessary_ 
'the RMB Rate I Eearish I Near Future lS ln 
The central bank of China has managed to stabilize 
the RMB rate . its unification in early 1994. Slnce 
However, since the new exchange rate system is more 
market-driven than before, we think the central bank 
might deplete its means to stabilize the rate at current 
level; given those fundamental determinants, such as 
trade deficit arid inflation, keep ort worsening in near 
fUture. If chibct could not narrow the gap of foreign 
trade and curb the high inflation, we think the RMB 
future rate is beariSh. 
Free Convertibility is a Long Way to Go ' 
The ultimate .goal of China's currency reform is to 
realize the RMB IS free convertibility. This task, 
however, is much ' easier to say than to do. The Chinese 
gbverttmeht shoUld do a good job to meet the pre-
conditions to free convertibility. We expect that the 
convertibility ih currentaccotint will become possible in 
El tnedium- term future, ',especially if China can re - enter 
I ' 
the GATT, which , l~Etds to a looser cdhtrol over import and 
I 
foreign e~chahg~~ The free convertibility in capital 
~ccotint, however, is still a long way to go. 
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other Things to bo 
the curr~nct rero~m is only one step of China's 
tnctrketization program. By and large, the credibility of 
China t El currency reform i ahd effectiveness of the RMB' s 
leverage role t will v~ry much depend on the other 
pctramet~rs furtctioning ih the economy. We will give the 
. d~tails in the next sectioh. 
Recotnmertdatiorts 
The credibility of the managed floating rate system, 
Cirtd the future move of the RMB rate are subj ect to the 
overall perform~hce of Chinais economy_ It is urgently in 
heed that Chiri~ should establish a healthy economic 
env:Lrorunent t in,which the exchange rate could perform its 
j ' 
tole more effE1ctively. To this end, the Chirlese 
government should adopt the following measures: 
Controlling Inflation 
As mentioned earlier, the runaway inflation is a 
major reason fdr' the fluctuation in RMB exchange rate.-. 
thererore, the government' Et guidance to economy must be 
effectiv~ly deflationary if the credibility of the RMB is 
hopea td maintain. The central bank should take the 
respohsibll1tie~ for controlling the scale of money 
supply ahd cooling down the overheated economy_ It should 
al so exett more independent monetary pol i cies , wi th the 
stabillzatlon of the RMI3 value as the primary target. 
Only when the soaring price index resorts to a normal 
level can the managing and ~tabiliiing of RMl3 exchange 
rate become fea~ible_ 
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Rebalancing Trade Deficit 
The huge amount of foreign trade imbalance is 
another pressure casting on the credibility of the RMB. 
bue to the shortage of hard currencies, China must 
develop more means to infUse foreign exchange into her 
reserve pool. The government shoUld strengthen the export 
:Lndustry to enlarge the exchange earning base; and 
exercise ~acro-regulatory measures to improve the 
efficiency of' import industry, to avoid blind and 
improper uses of foreign currencies. 
Restrti~turing Foreign Trade Industry 
The earlier elaboration of the elasticity theory in 
chapter four implies that China should restructure her 
foreign trade industry so as to mak~ the exchange rate's 
ieverage role more effective. Efforts should be put on 
increasing the weight of highly elastic industrial goods, 
ihcluding hlgh-tech, capital intensive t and value-added 
goods, in .the total composition of China's export 
products. Similarly, the government should ctdjust the 
~tructure of import products, making it more price-
eia~tic. The de~elopment of import substitutioh industry 
might be a meaningful way to this end. 
Itnprovirtg the Chinese Enterprises' Efficiel1cy 
The forthcoming re -entry to GATT brings challenges 
to Chinese enterprises; especially those state-run ones, 
since they have. to confront the keen competition with 
foreign counterparts if the barriers to free trade are 




. revigor~tlon of the chinese enterprises becomes a crucial 
issue to their ~urvival and success. The implementation 
of market economy forces them to be more efficient and 
market-driven, taking the exchange rate factor into 
a.ccount in formulating their business strategies. When 
the importArtce of exchange rate is recognized by these 
bUsihest3 units i it is expected to play the equilibrium 




. ~ .. 
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TABLE! I 
THE RMB OFFICIAL RATE 
! 
" 
Year Official Year official YeClr official Year Officia Year Official 
, Rate ' Rate ~ate Rate Rate 
49 2.20 59 2.46 69 2.46 79 1.63 89 3.72 
i 
2.40 2.46 2.46 1.6i 3.72 
2.90 2.46 2.46 , 1.59 3.72 
3.00 2.46 2 _,46 1.57 4.71 
, 
SO 3420 60 2.46 70 2.46 80 1.55 90 4.7i ' 
3.19 2.46 2.46 1.53 4.71 
3.10 2.46 2.46 1.51 4.71. 
3.10 2.46 2.46 1.49 5.21 
Si 3.05 61 2.46 71 2.46 8i 1.50 91 5.21 
~.02 2.46 2.46 1.75 5.27 ; 
3.00 2.46 2.46 1.75 5.31 
2.90 2.46 2~46 1.,75 5.35 ! 
52 2.93 62 2.46 72 2.41 82 '1.89 93 5.46 
2.75 2.46 2.37 . 
. 
1.B9 5.50 
2.71 2.46 2.32 1.89 5.42 
2.62 2.46 2.29 1.89 ' 5.54 
53 2.46 63 2.46 73 2.26 S3 1.98 93 5.79 
2.46 2.46 ~.25 1.98 5.79 
2.4b 2.46 2.24 1.98 /5.79 
r' 
2.46 2.46 2.22 1.98 ( 5 ~' 79 
54 2.46 64 2.46 I ' 74 2.08 84 2.32 94 \, ~. 70 
2.46 2.46 2.04 2.32 8.70 
2.46 2.46 2.03 2.32 
2.46 2.46 2.02 2.32 
" 
55 2. d6 65 2.46 75 2.00 B5 2.32 
:2.46 2.46 1.97 2.32 
2.46 2.46 1.90 2.32 
2.46 2.46 1.85 3.20 
56 2.46 66 2.46 76 1.92 86 3.20 
2.46 2.46 1.94 3.20 
2.46 2.46 i.95 3.72 
. ' 
2.46 2.46 1.96 I 3.72 
57 2.46 67 2.46 77 1.93 87 3.72 
2.46 2.46 1.91 3.72 
2.46 2.46 1.89 3.72 
2.46 2~46 1.BS 3.72 
58 2.46 GB 2.46 18 -, 1.85 88 3.72 
'. 
, 
2.46 2.46 1.B3 3.72' 
2.46 2.46 i.So 3.72 
2.46 2.46 1.73 3.72 
Source: China Firtartce; Chinese Firtancial Press. 
TABLE II 
1 . , 
OFFIC1AL RATE VS. SWAP RATE" 
(l~M13/US$ ) 
Year Month Official Rat"e Swap-Rate 
1992 . Jal1. 5.43 5.90 
Feb. 5.45 5.92 
Mar. 5.45 6.21 
Apr. ." 5.47 6.42 
May. 5.50 6.78 
JUn. 5.51 6.83 
JUl. 5.47 7.24 
Aug. 5.44 '7.40 
Sep. 5.42 7.01 
Oct. 5.49 :7.05 
Nov. 5.53 7.08 
bee. 5.53 7.62 
1993 Jah. 5.61 8.30 
Feb. 5.61 8.92 
Mar. 5.62 8.83 
Apr. 5.64 8.64 
May. 5.65 8.64 
Jun. 5.67 10.17 
Jul. 5.71 9.60 
Aug. 5.76 9.30 
Set!. 5.79 9.21 
Oct. 5;78 9.01 
Nov. 5 .. 78 8.78 
DeC. 5.78 8.70 
SoUrce! 1. Off:Lcial rates are collected tram China 
Pinance, Chinese Fihatldial Press 
2. Swap rates are col1~ctedfrom various 




OFFICIAL RATE VS. ISR 
(RMB/us$) , 
Year Month , Official Rate ·ISR 
19~1 Metr. 1.50 2.80 
Jun. 1.75 2.80 




1982 ; Mar. 1.89 2.80 i 
: ! Jun. 1.89 2.90 






, Mar. 1.98 2.80 
, Jun. 1.98 2.80 
l S~P· 1.98 2 .. 80 
Dee • 1.98 2.90 
1984 Mar. 2.32 2.80 
. Jun. 2.32 2.90 




1985 'Mar. 2.80 N.A. 
Source! china Fiti~hce, chine~~ Pinaheial press 
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TABLE IV 
EQUILIBRIUM RATE VS. OFFICIAL RATE 
' .•. , . : " . ,. . , . . 
Year Equilibrium Rate Official. Rate n.:lffer'ence ,. " 
1981 2.78 2.80 - 0 . 02 . . 
1992 -~ .. 76 2.80 ., -0.04 
1983 2.79 2~80 -0.01 
1994 2.98 2.80 0.18 
1985 3.46 .. 2.94 0.52 
1986 3.71 3.45 0.26 
1~81 4.01 3.12 0.29 
1989 4.52 3.72 0.90 
1989 4. SO; 3.77 i.03 · 
I 
1990 5.2:3: , 4.72 , 0.51 
' .' 
1 
SoUrce: Chen; 13:lao-ru, hA StUdy of Renminbi Exchahge 
Rate, ,t gcist China Pedcigogical College. Press: Shanghai, 
1992; p. S2. 
i ' 








Overseas Rcf11 i tlUJ1ce 
Ltlbot- Service nt1d 
COlltract Project 
Cnpitnt Accottut 
Foreigf1 bii-cct tUvestltlcnt 
trltet-ualiot1nl13oITowil1g 
Othet 
~orcigl1 Cout1try's Itespotlse 
No(e: + indlcntc~ positive lmpncl 
- itl(fic~Ht$ 11cgn tivc ith pnct: 








COhSl1me Price 111dex 
Itllpolt Sltbstitutio'l1 
Psychological J 111 pacl 
+ 
SoUrce ~ WU t nian-lu artd Chetl, Quan-geng, "A Study of 
:R~h1ni11bi E:>tchange ~ate t rt chil1ese Financial Press; 1992, 




FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE 
(tJs$ 100,000 t 000) · 
Year :gxport Import · Bai'arice 
1980 181.2 200.2 ., -19.0 
19B1 220.1 220.2 -0.1 
1982 223.2 192.9 30.3 
1983 ' 222.3 . 213 .9 8.4 
1994 261.4 274.1 -12.7 
1995 213.5 422.5 -149.0 
1996 309.4 429.0 -119.6 
19a7 , ~94. 4 4:32.2 -37.8 
I 
1989 415.2 552.8 -77.6 
1999 525~4 591.4 -66.0 
1990 620.9 533.5 87.4 
1991 719 .. 1 637,.9 81.2 
1992 850.0 900.0 50.0 
1993 910.5 105007 -140.2 
Source: chinese statistical Yearbook; state sta.tistical 
BUreaU~ 1993, p. 573 
TABLE VIr 












1 j 531' 
1 t 862 
2;247 
1,860 




SOurce! chinese statistical Yearbook t State Statistical 
gu~e&UI 1993, p.594~ 
TABLE VIII 
FOREIGN gXcllANG~ INCoME FROM CONTRACTED. PROJECTS AND 
LABOR SERVICES 
, Year Income from Income from 
contracted Projects Dabor Services 
. (US$l t 0.00 , 000) (US$l,OOOt OOO) 
1980 123 4s 
1981 140 47 
1992 189 159 
1983 315 131 
1984 494 139 
1985 663 172 
1986 819 174 
1987 1114 186 
1988 1253 i80 
1989 1494 202 
1990 1664 223 
1991 1939 393 
1992 2403 646 
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SOurce! chinese statistical Yearbook; state statistical 













UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL 














SoUrce! Chihes.e · statistical Yearbook, state statistical 
















Foreign Exchange ~eserVes 








2 t 9.23 




19 / 443 
27,000 
· 82 
Source! chinese stAtistical Yearbook, state statistical 
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T- M LO ~ 0> ~ try ' to t- 0> -r- try to t-- 0> ~ C'f) 1O t- 0> ~ . C'f) . 
to to to LO lr> <0 to <0 <0 (0 ~ t-- t-- ~ t-- co Co co co co 0> ' 0> ' 














---- Official Rate 
- - - - - Swap Rate 





1~ 6tficial ~ates are collected from China 
Finance, Chinese Financial Press 
2. Swap rate are collected from various jourhalsj newspapers, and magazines 
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E!lCHIBIT II! 
A cOMPARISON OF THE RMB EQUILIgRIUM RATE 










,- C\J M V t.n cb f'... 
CO CO CO CO CO CO CO 







o Equilibrium Rate 
m Official Rate 
11 Difference 
SoUrce: Chen; Biao-ru" A study of Renmihbi Exchahqe Rate, 











. . / 
o ~----~.-____ -----.~----41--------~1------~1-------+-----~------~----~ 
• 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
-5 
': 
. " ,., , '1' :1' ; 
::. 1 . :' ,; I: ' : :d 
study of kentninbi Exchange Rate, 











. " , , , A COMPARISON OF INFLATION RATE: 
CHINA AND WESTERN COUNTRIES 





~ le) (0 t- co 0> 0 y- N Ctj ~ 
co co co co co co (» 0> 0> 0> 0> 
0> t1> en 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 
,.- .,.- "t-- ,.- ;- ~ ,.- ;- ;- ,.-
Source: Data for China: ChiheseStatistical 
Yearbook, State statistical Bureau, 1993 I p. 273; data 
for th~ usA, Japan atld Germany : International Marketing 
bata and statistics, Eurombhitor~ 1994, p.197-199. 














N '"::j- to co 0 ~ C') t---.. to 0> 0 ~ N C') 
co co co co cO co co co co co en . en en en 
en 0) 0) en 0) en 0> en en en en en CJ) 0> 
~ ~ ~ ~ ....- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .,.- .,.-
SoUrce: chihese . statistical Yearbook, State statistical 
BUreau; 1993. p.573 
EXHIBIT VII 
EXPORT GOODS STRUCTURE 
, Primary Goods 
Manufac"tttred Goods 
o Food and Live Animals 
Chiefly for Food 
lit Beverage and Tobacco 
III NOh-Edible Raw Materials 
[@ Mineral Fuels, Lubicants 
and Related Materials 
Mill Animal and Vegetalbe Oils, 
Pats and Waxes 
[lliI Machinery and Trahsport 
Equipment 
~ Light ahd ,Textile Industrial 
Products 
90 
SbUrce! chinese . statisticai Yearbook; state Statistical · 
~ur~~u, 1993, p.S14. 
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EXHIBIT VIII 




-u Fo~·d·~·~-~i" ·Ci~~··A~·i~·~;'· 
Chiefly for Food 
m Beverage and Tobacco 
Ii!I Non-Edible Raw Materials 
0] Minetal Fuels, Lubicants 
and Related Materials 
[ill Animal and Vegetalbe Oils, 
: Fats and Waxes 
[J] Machihery and Transport 
Equipment 
~ Light and Textile Industrral 
Products 
SoUrc~ ~ ., Chihese Statistidal ' Yearbook, State Statistical 
~Ure~uJ 19~3, V~575. 
EXHIBIT I)t 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Source ~ chInese st:a.tistica1 .Yearbook, state Statistical 
aUreau, 1993 t p.594. 
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EXHIBIT X 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INCOME FROM CONTRACTED 







o ~ ~ M ~ ~ w ~ ro ~ 0 ~ N 
ro 00 - 00 00 ro 00 ro 00 00 00 ~ m m 
~ m ~ m m ~ m ~ m ~ ~ ~ m 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .,.... ~ ~ .,.... .,.... ~ .,..... 
D COhtracted Projects 
11 Labor Services 
Source: Chinese statistical Yearbook, Stq.te Statistical 
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D Contracted Value 
11 Utilized Value 
CD r-..... co 0> 0 ,.- C\J C") 
co co co ex:> 0> G> (J) (J') 
CJ) CJ) 0> CJ) CJ) CJ) CJ) Q) 
,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- , 
Source: Chinese statistical Yearbook, State Statistical 












. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES 
0 ,.- N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ co ()) 0 ,.-
co co co co co co co co co co 0> 0> 
0> 0> ()) 0> ()) ()) ()) m I 0> ()) 0> ()) 
,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.- ,.-
Source : chinese statistical Yearbook, State Statistical 
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